An emergency entry based on the fact a woman had not shown up for work in days was justified, and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Campbell v. Sarrazolla, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72486 (D. Idaho October 3, 2006):<\/p>\n
Under the first prong in this analysis, the police must have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance to protect life or property. Stafford,<\/em> 416 F.3d at 1073. In a recent Ninth Circuit case, the court held that the first prong was met where a father had phoned the police concerned about his daughter’s welfare because she could not be reached for several days, her car was in the driveway when the officers arrived at the address given by her father, a neighbor suggested that she should be home, and there was a lack of response to repeated knocking and phone calls to the daughter’s phone went unanswered. Martin v. City of Oceanside,<\/em> 360 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004).<\/p>\n
Defendants argue they had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an immediate need for assistance based on the followings facts: Plaintiff’s employer called the Garden City police and was concerned for her safety; Plaintiff had not shown up for work nor called to explain her absence and this was said to be out of character for her; Plaintiff had told co-workers about an abusive ex-boyfriend that may try to harm her; Plaintiff received flowers at work that day from her ex-boyfriend; Defendants were told by Neuberger’s neighbor of loud arguments and concerns of drug activity occurring in his home; Neuberger hesitated when asked about Plaintiff and his explanation for her absence from work – she was at Lucky Peak Reservoir – was inconsistent with the type of person the officers had been told that Plaintiff was; there was no response to the officers’ knocks and announcement at Plaintiff’s residence; and the front door was ajar.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
District Court’s finding of reasonable suspicion was supported by the record [but I find it really thin]. United States v. Chatterpaul, 200 Fed. Appx. 147 (3d Cir. October 5, 2006)* (unpublished):<\/p>\n
In this case, [officer] Overcash had a reasonable and articulable suspicion of illegal activity sufficient to justify asking Chatterpaul additional questions about the purpose of the trip. At the time, Overcash knew that: (1) Chatterpaul and his brother were speeding; (2) either Chatterpaul and his brother or the occupants of the white box truck were lying about whether the two trucks were traveling together; (3) Chatterpaul and his brother appeared nervous; (4) based on his prior experience in narcotics interdiction, rental trucks are frequently used to transport illicit drugs or other contraband.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant consented to an entry and search by a representative of the Division of Child and Family Services because of a call that the house was filthy and had a meth lab. In spite of this, she consented to an entry, including a search of places where children might go. United States v. Williams, 199 Fed. Appx. 828 (11th Cir. October 3, 2006)* (unpublished).<\/p>\n
Reasonable suspicion developed from a traffic stop of a new Cadillac Escalade [not reason in and of itself, but it is getting there] when the vehicle had drive out tags, the driver was nervous and moving around (making the trooper nervous), and the paperwork did not match much of anything he said about ownership. United States v. Vo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72590 (D. Kan. October 4, 2006).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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