Planned Parenthood of Indiana is subject to administrative inspections of its records for suspected child abuse under the federal Medicaid Fraud statute, but the Fourth Amendment is not a defense. Planned Parenthood of Indiana v. Carter, 854 N.E.2d 853 (Ind. App. September 22, 2006):<\/p>\n
We have already determined that IMFCU is acting within its statutory authority to investigate complaints of patient neglect in health care facilities based on PPI’s alleged failure to report child abuse as required by Indiana law. We have also determined that federal law requires PPI to furnish IMFCU, on request, with “any records necessary to disclose the extent of services [it] furnishes to recipients[.]” 42 C.F.R. \u00a7 431.107(b). To the extent that PPI challenges the scope of IMFCU’s request, we believe that this challenge is more properly addressed in the context of its Fourteenth Amendment informational privacy argument.<\/p>\n
n22 Because PPI’s Fourth Amendment claim is premised on its unsuccessful argument that IMFCU has no statutory authority to conduct its investigation, we do not reach the question of whether IMFCU’s request for records is a constitutionally permissible administrative search. See New York v. Burger,<\/em> 482 U.S. at 699-703 (discussing concept of and requirements for warrantless search of commercial premises in a “closely regulated” industry pursuant to a regulatory scheme); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,<\/em> 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“We have also allowed searches for certain administrative purposes without particularized suspicion of misconduct, provided that those searches are appropriately limited.”).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Consent during a traffic stop was the basis for extending the stop. State v. Jones, 204 S.W.3d 287 (Mo. App. S.D. September 22, 2006).*<\/p>\n
Three police cars blocking defendant backing out of his driveway is a seizure. He obviously would not feel free to leave since he could not. State v. Cabell, 2006 Ohio 4914, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4841 (6th Dist. September 22, 2006). Comment:<\/em> Forgive me, but I actually laughed out loud when I read in this case that the state contended that the defendant was not seized, appealing a suppression order: <\/p>\n
Applying the test of whether an arrest was effectuated, a reasonable person driving slowly down their driveway, confronted with a car approaching head-on, a car blocking exit from the rear, and a car blocking from the side, with officers exiting those vehicles with drawn guns, would not feel free to leave. The trial court held that the officers’ purpose in seizing appellee’s vehicle was “not to conduct a brief investigatory stop but rather, for the sole and immediate purpose of arresting the defendant.” Regardless of whether the surrounding facts and circumstances renders the act of hemming in and “pinching” appellee’s van an “arrest” or a “seizure,” the officers required probable cause. We find the state’s argument — that the act of stopping appellee’s van was an investigatory stop — without merit. The second assignment of error [by the State] is therefore not well-taken.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
DWI arrest justified a search incident. State v. Bowshier, 2006 Ohio 4929, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4859 (2d Dist. September 22, 2006).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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