\u201cA police officer’s \u2018characterization is not enough, standing alone, to implicate Fourth Amendment protections.\u2019 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988). The parties’ characterization of the events notwithstanding, the Court must conduct its own constitutional analysis.\u201d United States v. Mingo, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56104 (D. Minn. Mar. 31, 2020).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The officer here was responding to a call of a man flashing a gun in a group. When he got there and started out of the car, he saw defendant reach for his waistband, start backing up, and then flee. That was reasonable suspicion. People v. Cherry<\/a>, 2020 IL App (3d) 170622, 2020 Ill. App. LEXIS 217 (Mar. 31, 2020).* Officers had a tip that a man wanted for a sexual assault was at a particular house, and they found him outside. \u201cThe officers thus had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain defendant where there was an initial tip from a 911 call, there was temporal proximity between the time of the tip and defendant’s location, and defendant matched the caller’s description and general location.\u201d People v. Thornton<\/a>, 2020 IL App (1st) 170753, 2020 Ill. App. LEXIS 218 (Mar. 31, 2020).* \u201cA police officer’s \u2018characterization is not enough, standing alone, to implicate Fourth Amendment protections.\u2019 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988). The parties’ characterization of the events notwithstanding, the Court … Continue reading
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