When a ruse checkpoint is involved, the checkpoint case law does not apply. The defendant avoided the checkpoint\u2014he wasn\u2019t stopped at it, and reasonable suspicion developed from that. United States v. Carr, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33578 (D. Kan. April 5, 2010).*<\/p>\n
A hearing was not required on defendant\u2019s claim that his search incident violated Gant because, even assuming that his version of the facts are true, the search incident was valid. United States v. Mompremier, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33793 (S.D. N.Y. April 5, 2010).*<\/p>\n
Defendant\u2019s border search at Calexico was valid, and his complaints about the drug dog are essentially harmless and meaningless. United States v. Calderon-Quinonez<\/a>, 382 Fed. Appx. 540 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished), cert. denied 178 L. Ed. 2d 232, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 7160 (U.S., Oct. 4, 2010).*<\/p>\n Defendant did not respond immediately to an order to remove his hands from his pockets, and the officers pulled guns on him. There was not enough to show reasonable suspicion. United States v. Dorlette, 706 F. Supp. 2d 290 (D. Conn. 2010)*:<\/p>\n The officers’ concern for their safety, however, was unaccompanied by any articulable facts, or inferences drawn from them, that could give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Dorlette was, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity. Nor do they assert or provide grounds to conclude that their safety concern was tethered to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Indeed, aside from Edson’s rank speculation that the men had obtained weapons from the Diaz Street apartment and were going out to search for a fight, criminal activity was not a concept that the officers’ testimony suggests in any way drove their stopping Dorlette. Lacking reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot, the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they stopped Dorlette.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading