A document search, by its nature, is certainly going to be broad because officers will have to examine documents to determine whether they are within the “things to be seized,” but that does not make it an unconstitutional “general search.” United States v. Krabsz, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63506 (D. N.J. August 31, 2006)*:<\/p>\n
Similarly here, the Court finds that the warrant authorizing the search of Defendant’s house and business was not a general warrant. As recounted above, the warrant authorized the seizure of all documents within certain categories of financial records. Like in Christine,<\/em> “[b]y directing the searching officers to seize all of these items, the magistrate, rather than the officer, determined what was to be seized.” 687 F.2d 753. Moreover, the scope of items listed to be seized was limited by time, and by category. Finally, the introductory sentence further limits the type of documents to be seized to those in the name of, or on behalf of, Bishop Krabsz, and the entities in which he has a financial interest.<\/p>\n
Moreover, the warrant was not “general” even though the search required the agents to examine documents to determine whether they were within the scope of the items to be seized. As the Supreme Court has explained:<\/p>\n
In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized. Similar dangers, of course, are present in executing a warrant for the “seizure” of telephone conversations. In both kinds of searches, responsible officials, including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.<\/p>\n
427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976).<\/p>\n
Here, the Court finds no evidence that the agents failed to exercise the appropriate level of care. To be sure, Defendant points out that in executing the search the agents looked in such places as a dresser drawer and a shed. However, as the Government argues, and as the affidavit accompanying the warrant sets forth, it is typical for individuals engaged in tax fraud and evasion to hide cash at their homes. “Although the scope of the warrant was certainly extensive, the warrant was not general. . . . It was indubitably broad, but it was not ‘general.'” United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and Fifty-Seven Cents, <\/em>307 F.3d 137, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Videotape with audio captured by a separate microphone inside the police car showed that consent was voluntary. United States v. Perez, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63725 (N.D. Ind. August 24, 2006).*<\/p>\n
Defense counsel was not ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress that defendant did not validly consent to a search when he signed a consent form. United States v. Perez, 458 F. Supp. 2d 575 (N.D. Ill. August 16, 2006).*<\/p>\n
Tip from a recent arrestee was insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion for stop of the defendant. While the area was high crime, the fact the defendant happened to be there was insufficient to justify the stop since he did nothing illegal that the officer observed. State v. Porter, 2006 Ohio 4585, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 4533 (8th Dist. September 7, 2006).<\/p>\n
There is no Sixth Amendment or statutory right to appointed counsel in a civil forfeiture case even though it arose from a search and arrest. State v. $1,010.00 in American Currency, 2006 SD 84, 722 N.W.2d 92 (September 6, 2006).* <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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