\u201cAfter considering the totality of the circumstances [in great detail], the court finds that Gallegos’s consent to search his car and the two cell phones was freely and voluntarily given, at least with regard to a manual search on the date the agents had physical custody of the cell phones.\u201d Defendant consented to the search of his cell phone. \u201cHere, the iPhone was like a locked container, but, importantly, Gallegos gave agents the password. If a search of a cellphone is akin to an exhaustive search of a house, Gallegos essentially gave agents the keys. Of course, if one gives agents keys to search one’s house, the time to search is finite.\u201d United States v. Gallegos-Espinal, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87258 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2019). <\/p>\n
The club\u2019s claim that the City can engage in warrantless searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment is a question of law and ripe for review and won\u2019t be dismissed. Is a strip club a \u201cclosely regulated\u201d industry? Does the ordinance provide for an administrative search exception? Club Madonna v. City of Miami Beach<\/a>, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 15514 (11th Cir. May 24, 2019).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u201cAfter considering the totality of the circumstances [in great detail], the court finds that Gallegos’s consent to search his car and the two cell phones was freely and voluntarily given, at least with regard to a manual search on the … Continue reading