A defendant charged with harboring a fugitive under 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 1071 could not be convicted solely on testimony that she falsely denied the fugitive was there and then insisted upon her Fourth Amendment rights when the police were trying to get in to arrest the fugitive. United States v. Harris, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59406 (D. Ariz. August 21, 2006):<\/p>\n
Some might contend that the presence of Briones-Lopez in the apartment for approximately two hours while Ms. Harris refused entry and demanded a warrant constitutes the kind of “physical assistance” sufficient for conviction, but the Court has difficulty distinguishing his presence in the apartment during this period from Ms. Harris’ exercise of her Fourth Amendment rights. Assuming, hypothetically, that Ms. Harris had done nothing more than demand a warrant, and that it had taken officers two hours to obtain a warrant and gain entry to her apartment, the Court could not hold that Ms. Harris violated \u00a7 1071 by the presence of Briones-Lopez in her apartment for the two hours. The Ninth Circuit has held that “passive refusal to consent to a warrantless search is privileged conduct which cannot be considered as evidence of criminal wrongdoing. If the government could use such a refusal against the citizen, an unfair and impermissible burden would be placed upon the assertion of a constitutional right and future consents would not be freely and voluntarily given.” Prescott,<\/em> 581 F.2d at 1351 (quotation omitted). In this case, the only conduct engaged in by Defendants in addition to Ms. Harris’ assertion of her Fourth Amendment rights are the false statements made by Defendants to the officers. The Government has conceded this fact and has identified no other evidence that Defendants provided Briones-Lopez with physical assistance in avoiding detection by officers. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant was talkative when being given a warning ticket and the officer surmised that he was nervous. Consent was asked for without reasonable suspicion and without having told the defendant he was free to leave. Motion to suppress should have been granted. Reversed and conviction dismissed. United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. August 23, 2006).*<\/p>\n
Officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant under Adams v. Williams<\/em> when he was arriving at a prearranged location for an alleged drug deal. Nexus for a search warrant of his house was established by defendant leaving his house to go to the drug deal. United States v. Spaulding, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59504 (N.D. Ohio August 23, 2006).<\/p>\n
There was PC from a commonsense reading of the affidavit to believe that defendant’s vehicle was involved in getting him to a store for a theft of pseudoephedrine for use in manufacturing meth. While he was arrested in the store for possession of pseudo, that did not mean that there was no probable cause shown. Rather, it was a reasonable inference that defendant was involved in an ongoing crime of acquiring materials for making meth and something would likely be found in the car. United States v. Cancilla, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59534 (W.D. Pa. August 23, 2006).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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