The stop was on a city street, and defendant said the officer could \u201ccheck it\u201d when asked for consent. He was free to go [if he was willing to walk off from his car] when he consented. United States v. Santiago-Santiago, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67384 (N.D. Ala. April 18, 2017),* adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66468 (N.D. Ala. May 2, 2017).*<\/p>\n
Thin but found sufficient: \u201cIn addition, defendant takes issue with the officer’s statement that the first informant is \u2018trusted,\u2019 \u2018reliable,\u2019 and a \u2018proven informant,\u2019 and that all three informants refused to be identified. Defendant likens this to United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1996), in which the Court held that upholding this type of warrant \u2018would ratify police use of an unknown, unproven informant \u2014 with little or no corroboration \u2014 to justify searching someone’s house.\u2019 The defendant, however, leaves out an important detail contained in the affidavit. Officer Haines goes on to support his opinion regarding the informant’s trustworthiness by stating that \u2018[he has] since proven to be accurate on two following investigations.\u2019\u201d United States v. Moran, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68995 (N.D.W.Va. May 5, 2017).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The stop was on a city street, and defendant said the officer could \u201ccheck it\u201d when asked for consent. He was free to go [if he was willing to walk off from his car] when he consented. United States v. … Continue reading