A cell phone search warrant issued in violation of Georgia law would not be suppressed in federal court. Also, Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment are not coextensive, so the alleged violation of Rule 41 is not necessarily a violation of the Fourth Amendment. \u201cThus, even where Rule 41 applies, the Eighth Circuit has held that suppression is proper only where \u2018(1) there was prejudice in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional or deliberate disregard of a provision in the rule.\u2019 United States v. Burgard, 551 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir. 1977) (quotation omitted) (declining to suppress evidence in violation of the daytime requirements of Rule 41 where the agents’ failure to comply resulted in no advantage to the government and exclusion would be inappropriate); see also United States v. Freeman, 897 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1990) (declining to exclude evidence where violations of Rule 41 did \u2018not implicate the constitutional values of probable cause or description with particularity of the place to be searched and items to be seized\u2019). [\u00b6] Here, neither factor is satisfied.\u201d United States v. Salazar, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57125 (D. Minn. March 23, 2017), adopted, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56993 (D. Minn. Apr. 12, 2017).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
A cell phone search warrant issued in violation of Georgia law would not be suppressed in federal court. Also, Rule 41 and the Fourth Amendment are not coextensive, so the alleged violation of Rule 41 is not necessarily a violation … Continue reading