Defendant was a passenger in a stolen car, and there was no showing he knew anything about it so there was no probable cause for his arrest. But, he had no standing in the car in the first place, and there is a difference between an illegal stop and illegal detention. United States v. Springfield, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32492 (D.Mont. March 11, 2016):
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Springfield argues that he has standing because the Court should treat his illegal arrest as synonymous with an illegal stop and suppress the evidence law enforcement found in the Buick. But Springfield ignores the distinction between an illegal stop and an illegal detention, which is in essence, the difference between the outcomes in the cases upon which he relies, United States v. Twilley, 222 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2000) and United States v. Arvizu, 232 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2000), and the case that controls here, United States v. Pulliam[, 405 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2005)]. <\/p>\n
Relying on United Slates v. Twilley and United Slates v. Arvizu, Springfield argues that because law enforcement illegally arrested him, the evidence obtained during law enforcement’s subsequent search of the Buick must be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” (Doc. 31 at 4-5). But the Ninth Circuit squarely rejected this argument in Pulliam, when it held that “evidence will not be excluded as fruit unless the illegality is at least the “but for” cause of the discovery of the evidence.” Id. at 786-87. This holding distinguishes the factual scenario of an illegal stop from an illegal arrest.<\/p>\n
But for the illegal stops in Twilley and Arvizu, law enforcement never would have approached the vehicles, spoken with the defendants, observed their behavior, smelled drugs, or questioned the defendants’ stories — in other words, law enforcement’s suspicions never would have been raised and the arrests would never have occurred. Twilley, 222 F.3d at 1096; Arvizu, 232 F.3d at 1251-52. In Pulliam, however, the Ninth Circuit explained that “when the initial stop is lawful, the continued detention of the vehicle does not necessarily entail the detention of its occupants; they could simply be permitted to walk away … but a passenger with no possessory interest in a vehicle usually cannot … suppress the fruits of that detention, because Fourth Amendment rights are personal [and] may not be vicariously asserted.” Id. at 789 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Defendant was a passenger in a stolen car, and there was no showing he knew anything about it so there was no probable cause for his arrest. But, he had no standing in the car in the first place, and … Continue reading