Defendant\u2019s wife was alleged by the government to have consented to a search of two safes defendant had. There is a virtual presumption of common authority over marital property, and there is no evidence in the record after the hearing that her authority was limited. The only evidence the court has is that she consented. She was present for the first day of the suppression hearing and did not testify; she was not present the second day. United States v. Balanquet-Herrera, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4734 (W.D.Pa. Jan. 14, 2016).*<\/p>\n
Defendant was stopped and arrested after he came out of his house based on an arrest warrant. A search incident was proper. United States v. Mackin, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4479 (N.D.Ind. Jan. 14, 2016).*<\/p>\n
\u201cIn State v. Birchfield, 2015 ND 6, \u00b6 19, 858 N.W.2d 302, cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3916 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2015) (No. 14-1468), we held the criminal refusal statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment or N.D. Const. art. I, \u00a7 8. In State v. Smith, …, we held that consent to testing is not involuntary or coerced solely because an individual is advised of the implied consent law. In Beylund v. Levi, …, and Olson, at \u00b6\u00b6 12-13, we held the implied consent law does not violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine or N.D. Const. art. I, \u00a7 20. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5) and (7).\u201d Sturre v. Levi<\/a>, 2016 ND 6, 2016 N.D. LEXIS 12 (Jan. 14, 2016).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Defendant\u2019s wife was alleged by the government to have consented to a search of two safes defendant had. There is a virtual presumption of common authority over marital property, and there is no evidence in the record after the hearing … Continue reading