{"id":1768,"date":"2008-04-08T09:46:46","date_gmt":"2008-02-09T09:45:49","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2008-02-09T09:45:49","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=1768","title":{"rendered":"Ubiquity of school resource officers requires remand for determination of what this one’s function was: cop or school official?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The ubiquity of school resources officers led the Tennessee Supreme Court to remand a case for a determination of just what the officer’s role was at this school: school official or cop? [In school search cases in general, this case might prove to be significant because it asks the right questions.] R.D.S. v. State<\/a>, 245 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn. 2008):<\/p>\n

Increasingly, SROs and other law enforcement officers are becoming more involved in searches on school premises. The majority of jurisdictions which have faced the issue of what standard to apply to SROs or law enforcement officers assigned to schools have applied the reasonable suspicion standard. See, e.g., People v. Dilworth<\/em>, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317, 214 Ill. Dec. 456 (Ill. 1996) (holding that reasonable suspicion applies to liaison officer searching on own initiative); Commonwealth v. J.B.<\/em>, 719 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding that searches of public school students conducted by school police officers are subject to reasonable suspicion standard); Russell v. State<\/em>, 74 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. App. 2002) (applying reasonableness standard to officer assigned to school); In re Angelia D.B.<\/em>, 211 Wis. 2d 140, 564 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Wis. 1997) (holding that the reasonable grounds standard applied to search conducted by officer at request of and in conjunction with school officials). But see A.J.M. v. State<\/em>, 617 So. 2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a school resource officer employed by sheriff’s office must have probable cause to search); Patman v. State<\/em>, 244 Ga. App. 833, 537 S.E.2d 118, 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a police officer working special duty at a high school must have probable cause).<\/p>\n

These courts have considered such facts as whether the law enforcement officer was in uniform, had an office on the school’s campus, and how long each day the officer remained at the school. See T.S. v. State<\/em>, 863 N.E.2d 362, 369 (Ind. App. 2007); In re William V.<\/em>, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1464, 4 Cal.Rptr. 3d 695, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). The Indiana Supreme Court in Dilworth relied in part upon a school handbook that delineated the duties of the school liaison officer. 661 N.E.2d at 320. Additionally, the Florida District Court of Appeals cited a Florida statute outlining the duties of law enforcement officers assigned to the schools. See State v. N.G.B.<\/em>, 806 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Fla. Stat. \u00a7 1006.12 (2001) replaced by Fla. Stat. \u00a7 1006.12 (2003)). Another important consideration is whether the law enforcement officer is employed by the school system or an independent law enforcement agency. See T.S.<\/em>, 863 N.E.2d at 369 (noting that the school liaison officer was employed by the Indianapolis Public School Police); State v. D.S.<\/em>, 685 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that the law enforcement officer conducting the challenged search was employed by the local school system and not by an independent municipal or county law enforcement agency).<\/p>\n

In contrast, where law enforcement officers, not associated with the school system, initiate a search, or where school officials act at the behest of law enforcement agencies, the probable cause standard is generally applied. See, e.g., F.P. v. State<\/em>, 528 So. 2d 1253, 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the “school official exception” to the probable cause requirement does not apply when search is carried out at direction of police); State v. Tywayne H.<\/em>, 1997 NMCA 15, 123 N.M. 42, 933 P.2d 251, 254 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that probable cause was required when a search was conducted completely at the discretion of the police officers); In re Thomas B.D.<\/em>, 326 S.C. 614, 486 S.E.2d 498, 499-500 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that probable cause was required when police conducted a search in furtherance of law enforcement objective, rather than on behalf of school).<\/p>\n

School officials and law enforcement officers play fundamentally different roles in our society. A school official’s basic task is to educate students in a safe environment, whereas a law enforcement officer’s primary duty is to detect and deter crime. Law enforcement officers must generally satisfy the higher probable cause standard in order to conduct a search, because they stand in an adversarial role to citizens and the punishment for violating a criminal statute is more severe than the consequences of violating a school regulation.<\/p>\n

In turning to the case at bar, Deputy Lambert initiated and conducted a search of R.D.S.’s truck on the grounds of Page High School. Mr. Brown accompanied Deputy Lambert to R.D.S.’s truck and was present during the search, but did not participate. After balancing the competing interests between R.D.S.’s legitimate expectations of privacy and the State’s need for effectively investigating breaches of public order, we hold that the reasonable suspicion standard is the appropriate standard to apply to searches conducted by a law enforcement officer assigned to a school on a regular basis and assigned duties at the school beyond those of an ordinary law enforcement officer such that he or she may be considered a school official as well as a law enforcement officer, whether labeled an “SRO” or not. However, if a law enforcement officer not associated with the school system searches a student in a school setting, that officer should be held to the probable cause standard.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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