While being pursued, defendant fled from Missouri into Illinois, and the stop might have violated Illinois law, but it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Mitchell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76461 (E.D. Mo. October 12, 2007):<\/p>\n
There does appear to be a split in the circuits regarding whether an officer’s lack of authority under state law to conduct an arrest, which is otherwise constitutionally valid, constitutes an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Santoni v. Potter<\/em>, 369 F.3d 594, 598-99 (1st Cir. 2004) (recognizing split and declining to reach issue); United States v. Atwell<\/em>, 470 F. Supp. 2d 554, 573 (D. Md. 2007) (recognizing split). The view expressed by Bell<\/em> and Abbott<\/em>, however, continues to be the law of this Circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Stonerook<\/em>, 134 Fed. Appx. 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005) (following Bell); …. Moreover, the law expressed by this Circuit appears to express the emerging majority. Atwell<\/em>, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (collecting cases). Thus, to determine whether Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the court looks to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident. United States v. Flores-Sandoval<\/em>, 474 F.3d 1142, 1145 (8th Cir. 2007).<\/p>\n
On these facts, it is clear that the officers’ actions were proper under the Fourth Amendment. When a police officer observes a traffic violation — however minor — he has probable cause to stop the vehicle. Whren v. United States<\/em>, 517 U.S. 806, 818, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996); United States v. Martin<\/em>, 411 F.3d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 2005). “This is true even if a valid traffic stop is a pretext for other investigation.” United States v. Linkous<\/em>, 285 F.3d 716, 719 (8th Cir. 2002). Here, the evidence is undisputed that Officer Joyner personally observed a traffic offense committed by the Defendant. As such, the officers had probable cause to stop the car.<\/p>\n
Once an officer has a right to stop a driver, the officer may “conduct an investigation ‘reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place.'” United States v. Bloomfield<\/em>, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Cummins<\/em>, 920 F.2d 498, 502 (8th Cir. 1990)). “This reasonable investigation includes asking for the driver’s license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver about his destination and purpose.” Id.; United States v. Jones<\/em>, 269 F.3d 919, 924-5 (8th Cir. 2001). When “‘the responses of the detainee and the circumstances give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, an officer may broaden his inquiry and satisfy those suspicions.'” United States v. Johnson<\/em>, 58 F.3d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Barahona<\/em>, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir. 1993)); accord, United States v. Pereira-Munoz<\/em>, 59 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir. 1995) (officers are permitted to graduate responses to the demands of the particular situation).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Recovery of shotgun from defendant’s property was by a relative of his without any encouragement or assistance from the police. United States v. Gatling, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76564 (E.D. N.C. October 15, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Defendant was the target of a knock-and-talk because of his subscription to child porn websites. The officers spent over an hour with him, and he consented [by all appearances because he knew the computers would be taken anyway, so it was looked at as a realization that the government was going to get them anyway], and the consent was valid. United States v. Delano, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76626 (W.D. Ky. October 15, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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