Computer hard drive qualified as being in “plain view” when defendant admitted that there might be child porn on it. United States v. Mitchell, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74349 (S.D. Ga. October 3, 2007):<\/p>\n
The agent then pointedly asked Mitchell whether any “child pornography” would be on any of his computers, and Mitchell once again stated “Yes, probably.” Tr. 10, 93-94. Later, when given access to the office computer, the agent asked if that was the computer that contained the child pornography. Mitchell confirmed that it was. Tr. 11, 92-93. These are not “equivocal” statements. Quite the contrary, they are clear admissions that Mitchell’s office computer contained incriminating evidence stored on his hard drive. These admissions, coupled with Mitchell’s use of AdSoft (the same electronic payment service used by the Illegal CP website) to incur a $79.99 charge (a charge identical to the price for a subscription to that child pornography website), clearly furnished probable cause that Mitchell’s computer contained contraband images of child pornography.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Parole search was invalid because plaintiff was on the parole list in error, and the California courts already suppressed the search. This led to plaintiff suing the officers. The test for exclusion of evidence and qualified immunity are not the same. Willis v. Mullins, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74276 (E.D. Cal. September 24, 2007):<\/p>\n
Though the law was clear and the language of the California Supreme Court sets out a clear policy in favor of encouraging police to keep accurate records, exclusionary rule analysis differs from qualified immunity analysis. “The exclusionary rule was created to ensure that police would be deterred from acting in an unconstitutional manner by virtue of the knowledge that any evidence seized would be tainted and inadmissible. In such a context, it is logical to hold police officers accountable for the collective knowledge of the entire law enforcement team. However, in a \u00a7 1983 action individual civil liability is at issue. In such a situation, the officer can be held accountable–and therefore subject to personal liability–only for his or her own knowledge.” Ingram v. City of Los Angeles<\/em>, 418 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1190 (C.D. Cal. 2006). The Central District cites to U.S. Supreme Court dicta which states, “If the flyer [‘wanted flyer’ from another jurisdiction] has been issued in the absence of a reasonable suspicion, then a stop in the objective reliance upon it violates the Fourth Amendment. In such a situation, of course, the officers making the stop may have a good-faith defense to any civil suit.” United States v. Hensley<\/em>, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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