Parolee defendant claimed he was homeless, and later his PO discovered he might be living in a hotel. When homeless, the defendant was told to report his whereabouts ever night. He never reported. The officer’s information defendant was in a hotel was sufficient for reasonable suspicion of a search of his “residence” under state law so the residence search is valid. United States v. Franklin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71531 (E.D. Wash. September 25, 2007).<\/p>\n
Plaintiff barely stated a claim for relief for entry of his home without a search warrant when the SWAT team showed up because a Verizon telephone worker told the police that plaintiff had threatened him with a rifle. After a 12 hour standoff with plaintiff demanding a warrant, the police told the plaintiff to come out or they were coming in and somebody inside might get hurt in the process. Maloney v. County of Nassau, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71162 (E.D. N.Y. September 24, 2007):<\/p>\n
Several circuit courts have applied Payton<\/em><\/a> in instances in which the police never physically crossed the threshold but, through threats of force, compelled an individual to exit his home and surrender. See Sharrar v. Felsing<\/em>, 128 F.3d 810, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Maez<\/em>, 872 F.2d 1444, 1450-51 (10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Al-Azzawy<\/em>, 784 F.2d 890, 893 and n.1 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144 (1986); United States v. Morgan<\/em>, 743 F.2d 1158, 1164 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985). All of these cases are similar to the case at bar in that they involved instances in which the police surrounded the defendants’ home, then used actual or implied threats of violence to coerce a surrender outside of the home.<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
Plaintiff expressly alleges that it was “[t]he continued threat of such harm to Plaintiff’s family” that caused plaintiff to leave his home and surrender to the police. Id.<\/em> at P 41. In addition, plaintiff alleges that the police “performed the aforesaid acts under non-exigent circumstances.” Id.<\/em> at P 49. In light of these allegations and the arguable nature of plaintiff’s Payton<\/em> claim, the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss the first and third causes of action on the ground that plaintiff fails to state a federal Constitutional violation is denied.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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