In this case, a codefendant decided to roll, and he finally provided information to the government. He was not a government investigator, and what he subsequently told the government in its debriefing about how the searches went down didn\u2019t really help the defendants enough to satisfy Brady\u2019s prejudice prong, even if the government was chargeable with that knowledge. In fact, considering it for all that its worth, it doesn\u2019t even change the outcome. United States v. Barcelo, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113906 (S.D. N.Y. August 15, 2014).<\/p>\n
Defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider the denial of motion to suppress without a hearing doesn\u2019t allege anything that suggests that the court was wrong in the first place or that a hearing was even required. What are the disputed material facts? None. United States v. Wilson, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113638 (D. Ariz. August 15, 2014).*<\/p>\n
Plaintiffs in this \u00a7 1983 case ran a pawn shop where police believed they were fencing stolen goods. With the cooperation of Home Depot, expensive stuff was sold there for little or nothing [which proves nothing; it is, after all a pawn shop]. They were charged with these \u201ccontrolled sales\u201d but ultimately the local DA declined prosecution. So they sued the police involved. There was at least some probable cause there, and that\u2019s enough to defeat the 1983 claim. Also, after the initial controlled sales, other stolen property showed up there, and that was a valid inference the police could rely on. [See Treatise \u00a7 43.11 on pawnshops as regulated businesses and why.] Young v. Owens<\/a>, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15768, 2014 FED App. 0634N (6th Cir. August 15, 2014).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In this case, a codefendant decided to roll, and he finally provided information to the government. He was not a government investigator, and what he subsequently told the government in its debriefing about how the searches went down didn\u2019t really … Continue reading