An uncorroborated tip from a 911 caller stating that a person is wanted by the police cannot form the basis for reasonable suspicion for the police to conduct a stop of that person. The only fact that could be corroborated by the stop was the defendant’s name, dress, and location. No unlawful conduct was observed. The frisk of the defendant that produced a weapon should have been suppressed. State v. Herrington, 961 So. 2d 1271 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2007):<\/p>\n
In the instant case an anonymous tip was relayed to Detective Perez. The tipster gave the names of two men, described what they were wearing, said that they were walking together, and asserted that the two men were wanted in a shooting. The only reliable information that was given by the tipster was Mr. Herrington’s name and a description of the clothes he was wearing. Although Mr. Herrington was walking near the location where he was said to be walking, he was alone, and he was not walking with another person as the tipster had said he was. Additionally, there was no predictive information given about Mr. Herrington’s future actions, and the information that Mr. Herrington and the person with whom he was supposed to be walking were wanted in connection with a shooting was false. Further, Mr. Herrington did not appear nervous when Detective Perez confronted him, and he fully cooperated with the police. No surveillance was conducted, and there was no corroboration of the information given by the tipster.<\/p>\n
Based on these facts and circumstances, we find that the investigatory stop of Mr. Herrington was not justified. Therefore, the weapon that Mr. Herrington was carrying was illegally seized. The trial court erred in failing to grant Mr. Herrington’s motion to suppress the evidence.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Officer’s own creation of exigent circumstances denied him summary judgment on a claim of a warrantless entry based on those exigent circumstances. Bayer v. Marinette County & Rick Berlin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49243 (E.D. Wis. July 9, 2007):<\/p>\n
The defendants contend that under the circumstances of this case, Deputy Berlin reasonably believed that immediate entry into the lower section of Scooter’s was necessary in order to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence. They note that at the time Deputy Berlin and his law enforcement team entered the bar, several dancers were in the lower level. This fact, they argue, together with the fact that there were bathrooms in the downstairs level with toilets, sinks, and showers in which the drugs could be quickly tossed, necessitated prompt action to avoid destruction of evidence. Because the undercover investigation had established probable cause to believe there were illegal drugs in the lower level, and because Deputy Berlin reasonably thought the destruction of the drugs was imminent, the defendants argue the warrantless entry and search was justified.<\/p>\n
This argument fails, however, because it ignores the fact that it was the conduct of Deputy Berlin that created the exigency that the defendants now claim justified the warrantless entry. It is well-established that law enforcement officers cannot justify their search on the basis of exigent circumstances of their own making. United States v. Duchi,<\/em> 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Buchanan,<\/em> 904 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Thompson,<\/em> 700 F.2d 944, 950 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Rosselli,<\/em> 506 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Curran<\/em>, 498 F.2d 30, 34 (9th Cir. 1974); Niro v. United States<\/em>, 388 F.2d 535, 539 (1st Cir. 1968). In this case, Deputy Berlin elected to enter the tavern without a warrant after being apprised of the undercover officers’ observations even though, by his own admission, he had sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for a warrant. By entering the tavern without a warrant under these circumstances, he caused the very exigency that he now claims justifies the warrantless entry of the lower level. He alerted the occupants of the tavern to the presence of police and their interest in searching for drugs. If this were enough to show exigent circumstances, a warrant would never be required to search a person’s home for drugs as long as there was probable cause to believe drugs were being stored inside. An officer could simply appear at the door and ask permission to search. Upon refusal, any reasonable officer would be justified in believing that the drugs would be gone by the time he returned with a warrant. Clearly, if the requirement for a warrant is to be meaningful, more must be shown to establish exigent circumstances.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant’s own version of events showed that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. Wallace v. United States, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49412 (E.D. Mo. July 9, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Officer’s questioning did not unduly extend the traffic stop to vitiate consent. Trujillo v. State, 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 790 (July 9, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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