The defendant was stopped for a traffic offense. “After directing the defendant to pull over and stop, the officer approached the vehicle and observed the defendant sweating, crying, reluctant to speak in response to questions, and gagging after being ordered out of his car. When the defendant opened his mouth on the officer’s command, the officer noticed a clear plastic bag in it, covered in blood and saliva, but the defendant refused to spit it out. Suspecting that the bag contained cocaine, the officer grabbed the defendant by the throat with one hand and applied enough pressure to inhibit the defendant’s ability to swallow. After about fifteen to twenty seconds, the defendant spit the bag onto the sidewalk.” Grier v. State, 868 N.E.2d 443 (Ind. 2007):<\/p>\n
The application of force to a detainee’s throat to prevent swallowing of suspected contraband violates the constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure. By grabbing the defendant’s throat to prevent him from swallowing the suspected bag of drugs, the police violated this constitutional protection.<\/p>\n
Evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search must be suppressed. … We therefore hold that the trial court should have granted the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained by the application of physical force to his throat to prevent him from swallowing it.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Consent after arrest in Indiana can only be sought after a Miranda<\/em> warning. Peel v. State, 868 N.E.2d 569 (La. App. 2007):<\/p>\n
When considering the above, we can only conclude that Peel and Capps were in custody for purposes of Miranda after admitting that they had committed a criminal offense. Thus, for a consent to search to be valid, they were entitled to an advisement of the right to counsel before a valid consent to search the motel room could be obtained. Inasmuch as the record unequivocally establishes that no such advisements were given, the trial court erred in denying Peel’s motion to suppress.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant brought a backpack to a friend’s house and left it for a while. The friend’s parents could smell marijuana, and they called the police. The officer smelled the marijuana and he seized it and opened it later. The plain smell doctrine only determines probable cause; not an ability to search without a warrant. State v. Wise, 2007 Ohio 3113, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 2873 (6th Dist. June 22, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading