Consent of driver to search car did not extend to a passenger’s purse. Smith v. Smith, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 730 (June 13, 2007):<\/p>\n
We conclude under the specific facts and circumstances here that it was not reasonable for Officer Bovy to believe the consent given by Montgomery to search the vehicle authorized a search of the purse. The purse was found by Bovy sitting on the front passenger seat where Smith, the only female in the vehicle, had been sitting immediately before he asked her to exit the vehicle. Thus, all of the facts available to Bovy at the time of the search supported a conclusion that Smith had placed the purse on the seat as she got out of the vehicle and it belonged to her, not Montgomery. We agree with the district court that “it should have been clear to the officer that the purse belonged to the passenger and not the driver.” Accordingly, we conclude it was unreasonable for Bovy to believe the purse belonged to anyone other than Smith or that anyone other than she had actual or apparent authority to consent to a search of the purse.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Patdown revealed a hard object which defendant volunteered was a knife, and the officer was justified in reaching into his pocket for it. “The fact that the object was in fact a marijuana pipe does not change the result. The district court erred in granting the motion to suppress.” State v. Shine, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 711 (June 13, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Defendant failed to show that the officer’s affidavit was made recklessly. Parsing the words in the affidavit did not show recklessness in the choice of words. Omission of reference to a pathway from the marijuana grow operation added nothing to defendant’s challenge. State v. Blow, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 747 (June 13, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Telling the defendant that the officer need to talk to him outside was a stop because no reasonable person would feel able to just ignore it and walk away. State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216 (Mo. App. 2007):<\/p>\n
In response to Barklage’s request that Roark return to the parking lot, Roark asked for an explanation. Barklage declined that request, saying that he would explain outside. At this point in the encounter, a reasonable person in Roark’s position would not have felt free to disregard Barklage and “go about his business.” Bostick<\/em>, 501 U.S. at 434. We therefore determine that by the time that Roark and Barklage arrived outside, a Fourth Amendment stop had occurred and turn to the question of what articulable facts support the State’s assertion that Barklage had a reasonable suspicion that Roark was involved in criminal activity.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading