Gunshot fired from an upstairs bedroom of a house justified its entry, twice. United States v. Yanez, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39389 (S.D. Tex. May 31, 2007):<\/p>\n
Here, before the officers entered defendant’s home, they faced a fluid, fast-moving situation in which the safety of the public was at risk as an unknown gunman fired a weapon from an upstairs bedroom. Such a situation presents the paradigmatic instance of exigent circumstances, in which the officers reasonably acted with haste to enter the premises and stop a shooting spree they reasonably believed was endangering neighborhood citizens. Accordingly, while warrantless entries into a home are presumptively unreasonable, see Payton, 445 U.S. at 586, the court finds that the Government’s claim of exigent circumstances rebuts the presumption and renders the initial entry a reasonable one. After the officers entered the home, they found the defendant’s two sisters, removed them from harm’s way, and escorted them outside. This action was clearly motivated by the need to protect those inside who could have been shot by the as-yet unidentified shooter or shooters. This entry into defendant’s home does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.<\/p>\n
. . .<\/p>\n
The case at bar presents very similar circumstances to those in Pringle. Here, the officers approached a small bedroom from which they reasonably believed the shots were fired. They found two persons who cautiously emerged into the hallway, understandably raising the officers’ suspicion. At the time, the officers had no way to know whether one or both of the suspects had been firing the weapon. They only knew that a firearm had been discharged several times, but not by whom. As the officers came upon the room, it was thus reasonable for them to believe that either or both of the suspects had fired the weapon or had engaged in a joint venture to violate the law. Accordingly, the officers had probable cause to believe that this defendant, Gabriel Yanez, was guilty of an offense, and his arrest did not contravene the protections of the Fourth Amendment. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Videotape of the stop supports the government’s claim of consent. United States v. Brown, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39539 (S.D. Ohio May 31, 2007).* <\/p>\n
Tazering of plaintiff during his fingerprinting was not unreasonable, and summary judgment was granted against him. He continued to resist during book-in. Price v. Austin Police Dep’t, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39378 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2007).*<\/p>\n
Qualified immunity is tough to be applied at the pleading stage against the plaintiff, but it can be. Here, it could not be applied. Horton v. Williams, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39201 (M.D. Ala. May 30, 2007):<\/p>\n
At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a complaint should not be dismissed on qualified-immunity grounds unless its allegations, on their face, show that qualified immunity bars recovery. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1022. Applying that standard here, the court does not believe that Horton’s Fourth Amendment claim against Shockley should be dismissed. Horton alleges that on August 2, 2005, Shockley caused a warrant to be issued for Horton’s arrest for furnishing a false report to a law enforcement officer even though he had evidence that proved her report was not false and even though the evidence was clear that she had not committed a criminal offense. Compl. PP 16-17, 22. Faced with such evidence, a reasonable officer could not have believed that probable cause was present, and a reasonably well-trained officer would know that there was a lack of probable cause for an arrest warrant. Accordingly, Shockley’s qualified-immunity defense does not defeat Horton’s Fourth Amendment claim at the motion to dismiss stage, and his motion to dismiss on that ground will therefore be denied, albeit with leave to renew the qualified-immunity defense on a motion for summary judgment.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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