CA10: Excessive and unnecessary use of a prisoner restraint chair when plaintiff was in juvenile detention overcame qualified immunity

A 1983 plaintiff stated a claim for excessive and unnecessary use of a prisoner restraint chair when he was in juvenile detention. Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2013):

Weeks before eleven-year-old, 4’11,” 96-pound Brandon Blackmon arrived at the juvenile detention center in Sedgwick, Kansas, officials there made a new purchase: the Pro-Straint Restraining Chair, Violent Prisoner Chair Model RC-1200LX. The chair bore wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints all. In the months that followed, the staff made liberal use of their new acquisition on the center’s youngest and smallest charge. Sometimes in a legitimate effort to thwart his attempts at suicide and self-harm. But sometimes, it seems, only to punish him. And that’s the nub of this lawsuit.

Now an adult, Mr. Blackmon has brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various members of the juvenile detention center’s staff, alleging they violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights guaranteed to him as a pretrial detainee. His claims focus primarily on their regular resort to the Pro-Straint chair, but he also contends they used other unlawful punishments, deprived him of essential medical attention, and should have transferred him to another facility. At summary judgment in the district court the defendants claimed qualified immunity and sought dismissal as a matter of law. The district court, however, declined the request and set the case for trial. At least when the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Blackmon, the district court explained, they suggest the defendants sometimes exceeded the scope of the qualified immunity they enjoy. In this interlocutory appeal, the defendants ask us to reverse the district court’s decision.

This we find we cannot do. True, qualified immunity is strong stuff: the defense shields public officials from suit as long as their conduct didn’t infringe any legal rights clearly established at the time. See Camretta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011); Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2011). But even accounting for this, we find the results the district court reached correct in all but one particular.

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