SCOTUS: ““The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge.”

“The presence of probable cause for one charge in a criminal proceeding does not categorically defeat a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim relating to another, baseless charge. The parties, and the United States as amicus curiae, all agree with this conclusion, which follows from both the Fourth Amendment and traditional common-law practice.” Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, 23-50 (U.S. June 20, 2024). More from the syllabus:

Under the Fourth Amendment, a pretrial detention counts as an unreasonable seizure, and so is illegal, unless it is based on probable cause. See Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, at 364–369. Even when a detention is justified at the outset, moreover, it may become unreasonably prolonged if the reason for it lapses. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S., 348, 354–357. So if an invalid charge causes a detention to start or continue, then the Fourth Amendment is violated. Bringing the invalid charge alongside a valid one does not categorically preclude this possibility. As the starkest possible example, consider a person detained on a drug offense supported by probable cause and a gun offense that is not. If the prosecutor drops the gun charge, leaving the person in jail on the drug charge alone, then the baseless charge has caused a constitutional violation by unreasonably extending the detention. The person should not be categorically barred from bringing a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim just because the baseless charge was brought along with a good one.

The same conclusion follows from the common-law principles governing malicious-prosecution suits. This Court has analogized claims like Chiaverini’s to the common-law tort of malicious prosecution, and has explained that the tort can inform courts’ understanding of this type of claim. Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43–44. A plaintiff bringing a common-law malicious-prosecution suit had to show that an official initiated a charge without probable cause. But he did not have to show that every charge brought against him lacked an adequate basis. See, e.g., Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 198 (it was no “defen[s]e that there was probable cause for part of the prosecution”).

These uncontested points suffice to doom the Sixth Circuit’s categorical rule barring a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim if any charge is valid. Of course, a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution suit depends not just on an unsupported charge, but on that charge’s causing a seizure—like the arrest and three-day detention here. The parties and amicus curiae offer three different views of how that causation element is met when a valid charge is also in the picture. But this issue is not properly before the Court, so the Sixth Circuit should address it on remand. Pp. 4–8.