Considering the deferential standard that search warrant affidavits are entitled to, the court of appeals erred in focusing on what was not in the affidavit rather than what was. It was reasonable to conclude that the cocaine in a garage had been transferred to a car where it was found. The affidavit was not perfect, considering it was drafted in the heat of the moment of the investigation, and it would have been better if it included more information that the police had, but it certainly was not fatal to have not included it. So, the warrant for the house was valid. Rodriguez v. State, 232 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).*<\/p>\n
Defendant’s consent to a blood draw signed in a Louisiana prison was found to be valid. His argument was that he thought it was to be used in a Louisiana investigation, not a Texas investigation. The consent form itself belied that contention. Jones v. State, 225 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App. \u2014 Houston (14th Dist.) 2007).*<\/p>\n
Exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry by Virgin Islands police because they had a report of someone with a felony conviction having just come out of the house, firing a gun, and going back inside. When they arrived, children visible from the door looked scared. After they got inside, a protective sweep found the man hiding under a bed, and the gun would have been found anyway for inevitable discovery purposes. United States v. Parris, 229 Fed. Appx. 130 (3d Cir. 2007)* (unpublished).<\/p>\n
\u00a7 1983 claim barred: “a verdict in Gingras’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his South Dakota conviction. Thus, under Heck<\/em>, Gingras’s claims are not cognizable under \u00a7 1983.” Gingras v. Wood, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34553 (D. S.D. May 10, 2007).<\/p>\n Defendant approached a police car surveying damage after a storm, and the defendant’s right wheels went into high water on the side of the road. The police car did not have its emergency lights on, and the officer stopped the defendant because he remembered that the defendant had a previously suspended license but knew nothing of the current status. The stop was unreasonable. The defendant argued that the community caretaking function should not apply to a moving vehicle, which the court did not embrace, but it held that the stop was invalid under any standard. State v. Craveiro, 155 N.H. 422, 924 A.2d 361 (2007).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading