{"id":983,"date":"2007-11-15T21:36:57","date_gmt":"2007-05-12T08:11:49","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-05-12T08:11:49","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=983","title":{"rendered":"Driver&#8217;s possession of a vehicle is normally enough to create an expectation of privacy, but not where the defendant stopped with others tossed the keys and remained silent when asked who had the vehicle"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Ohio recognizes that the driver of a car owned by another and with permission of the owner normally has an expectation of privacy.  When stopped with others, however, defendant remained silent when they were all asked by a police officer about his relationship to the car because the keys had been tossed. [Tossing the keys is an act designed to disassociate from the vehicle.]  State v. Middleton, 2007 Ohio 2227, 2007 Ohio App. LEXIS 2076 (8th Dist. May 10, 2007):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>[*P27]  In the instant case, Middleton attempts to argue that he &#8220;took normal precautions to maintain his privacy&#8221; in the area searched. During the incident, Middleton maintains that although he was outside the vehicle, he remained in close physical proximity to the Chevy Caprice. He also claims that the keys were discovered on the ground of the parking lot, only two feet away from him and that the doors to the vehicle were closed and locked. Finally, Middleton argues that the jacket was located on the floor of the vehicle, not in plain view and that the gun was discovered because Detective McClendon reached inside the pocket of the jacket.<\/p>\n<p>[*P28]  However, if Middleton wanted to take normal precautions to maintain privacy, he should have declared to the police officers that he was in lawful possession of the Chevy. Detectives McClendon and Crayton stated that they asked Middleton and the other individuals who owned the Chevy and who owned the keys that were found on the ground of the parking lot. No one acknowledged ownership and no one seemed to know who owned the vehicle or the keys. Middleton did not assert ownership of the vehicle, nor did he contend that he was in lawful possession of the vehicle. Thus, Middleton lacks standing to challenge the search and seizure.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Asking plaintiff to leave was not a Fourth Amendment violation. The case was intertwined with a First Amendment claim, which also was dismissed. Qualified immunity also applied.  Ramos v. Carbajal, 508 F. Supp. 2d 905 (D. N.M. 2007).*<\/p>\n<p>Applying the state consitution only, the Delaware court finds that the defendant&#8217;s stop was with reasonable suspicion. Ross v. State, 925 A.2d 489 (Del. 2007).*<\/p>\n<p>Officer saw same unique truck configued for a hidden compartment again on the same highway. The videotape broke, so the exchange between the officer and the motorist was lost, but it was up to 50 minutes long, which the court finds was not too long to issue a traffic ticket [which is a real stretch]. That led to consent. State v. Faga, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 554 (May 9, 2007):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>court noted, our supreme court has previously upheld a detention of fifty minutes as reasonable following a routine traffic stop. <em>Id.<\/em> at 559. We recognize this may have been a long time to issue a speeding ticket; however, it was not unreasonable under the circumstances. The length of the detention and the action of the trooper were justified by the traffic violation, the time needed to perform routine checks on the truck and the defendant, the trooper&#8217;s reasonable suspicion based on the unusual configuration of the truck, his past experience with a nearly identical truck, the implausibility of the defendant&#8217;s account of her use of the truck, and the defendant&#8217;s nervousness. We find no violation of the defendant&#8217;s rights based on the length of the stop.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Watching defendant drive the wrong way on a one-way street a second time was reason enough to stop him. State v. Poling, 2007 Iowa App. LEXIS 559 (May 9, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>b2evALnk.b2WPAutP <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=983\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"pingsdone","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-983","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/983","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=983"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/983\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=983"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=983"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=983"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}