Plaintiff contended that she was arrested without the police conducting an adequate investigation into possible defenses. This they were not required to do. Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27699 (D. Conn. March 31, 2007):<\/p>\n
As a general rule, moreover, an officer who has probable cause for an arrest is not required to refrain from seeking a warrant until he has investigated a possible defense of lack of specific intent. See Romagnano v. Town of Colchester<\/em>, 354 F. Supp. 2d 129, 135-36 (D. Conn. 2004) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,<\/em> 443, U.S. 137, 145-46, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979)). Nothing in the record supports an exception to this rule. There is no evidence Lieutenant Munoz had reason to believe Bonnie was acting without the requisite criminal intent. In particular, there is no evidence he knew of child abuse by Jeffrey, or even a single allegation of such abuse, at the time he prepared his affidavit. As mentioned earlier, omitted information is relevant only if it was within the officer’s knowledge. See Caldarola v. Calabrese<\/em>, 298 F.3d 156, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2002). <\/p>\n Defendant’s challenge that he was arrested on an arrest warrant from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, but then transported to the Cleveland City Jail, did not state a constitutional violation. United States v. Henderson, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27696 (N.D. Ohio April 13, 2007).*<\/p>\n It is not unconstitutional for a prosecutor to up a plea offer because the prosecutor was made to go through a suppression hearing. Not having a suppression hearing would have saved time and resources. State v. Thomas, 392 N.J. Super, 920 A.2d 142 (2007): <\/p>\n Although it is true that plea agreements are unacceptable if based on an illegal term or condition, Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 4.3 on R. 3:9-3 at 822 (2007), we disagree with the proposition that an agreement to forego filing a motion to suppress constitutes such an illegal term or condition. The prosecutor’s offer of a harsher sentence because defendant filed a motion cannot be deemed to have violated any of his rights. Under both the general rules applicable to plea agreements, R. 3:9-3(e), and the specific requirements for negotiated agreements in section 12, a court faced with a plea agreement that does not serve the interests of justice may vacate the plea or permit the defendant to withdraw from it. Under section 12, however, the court may not impose a lesser sentence than that negotiated between the parties. Here the court expressly found that the plea agreement served the interests of justice, and defendant himself never argued to the contrary.<\/p>\n Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in imposing a lesser sentence on defendant than the one negotiated between him and the prosecutor pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading