Officers searched two apartments in a warrant for one, and the good faith exception could not be applied. All factors pointed to upstairs Apt. 2, the purported residence of the defendant by all accounts. After officers got there, it turned out defendant was really living in downstairs Apt. 1. Clearly, the USMJ only authorized a search of Apt. 2. On a cost-benefits analysis of the benefits of suppression v. social costs, the balance favors suppression of the child pornography. United States v. Bershchansky, 958 F. Supp. 2d 354 (E.D. N.Y. 2013).<\/p>\n
The owner of an iPhone who loaned it to the defendant had apparent authority to consent to its search after it was taken off defendant. United States v. Mitchell, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102092 (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2013), prior opinion 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188717 (M.D. Fla. August 21, 2012).<\/p>\n
Consent was voluntary on totality: \u201cMost significant, however, is Salcedo’s admission that he allowed the agents to search his apartment because he thought that if they failed to find the evidence, then he \u2018would be home free.\u2019\u201d United States v. Salcedo<\/a>, 533 Fed. Appx. 796 (9th Cir. 2013).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading