Defendant made a straw purchase of an AK-47, and they followed her where she was delivering it. Agents came to the door close on her heels, and they heard it locked. The warrantless entry was based on exigent circumstances. This was not an unreasonable police created exigency. United States v. Jackson, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82352 (E.D. Va. June 11, 2013):<\/p>\n
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The Court believes that there is little doubt that the law enforcement officers had an objectively reasonable belief that their own safety could be jeopardized by a delay in entering the residence. The record adequately demonstrates that Defendant withdrew into the residence of a convicted felon while in possession of an AK-47 style semi-automatic assault firearm that fires powerful 7.62mm ammunition. The Court believes that the subject weapon itself presented a very high degree of danger to law enforcement.<\/p>\n
Indeed, examining the conditions faced by the agents, the Court believes that the confluence of circumstances provided law enforcement with justifiable reasons to fear for officer safety. Despite Defendant’s factual protestations, she is unable to escape the fundamental fact that Defendant disregarded law enforcement while in possession of an exceedingly dangerous firearm, withdrawing into the residence and locking the door behind her to prevent the entry of agents. The Court notes that the residence was that of a convicted felon, and the recent location of trafficking in crack cocaine. Despite having made their presence known, the agents received no response from the confirmed occupants within. Furthermore, the agents were unable to see into the residence in order to ascertain the danger they faced from within.<\/p>\n
Standing outside of Mr. McLeod’s residence and uncertain about how many individuals were present within, the agents in this case were faced with an inherently dangerous assault weapon that could have been removed, hidden, or possibly loaded and used against them from a concealed position. The Court also notes that a loaded SKS magazine was, in fact, found within the residence, further validating the agents’ concerns that the weapon then was capable of use against law enforcement. (Tr. 151:8-21.) Viewing the situation in its totality, the agents could have reasonably found exigent circumstances justifying their warrantless entry at the time agents entered the residence. See Reed, 935 F.2d at 643 (per curiam)(holding that presence of guns within a residence, because of the inherent danger involved, justifies “searches and seizures on the basis of exigent circumstances”); United States v. Rodgers, 924 F.2d 219, 222-23 (11th Cir. 1991)(finding that exigent circumstances arose when police saw lying on a couch two handguns that suspect, a convicted felon, was not allowed to possess); Cephas, 254 F.3d at 495 (“the possibility of danger to police guarding the site” as a factor to be considered in analyzing the question of exigent circumstances”).<\/p>\n
To the extent that Defendant argues that the exigency was created by law enforcement, the Supreme Court has rejected the “police created exigency” doctrine previously developed by lower courts, stating that “the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense.” Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that it is immaterial whether law enforcement created the exigency upon which they rely to justify a warrantless search so long as they “did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id.<\/p>\n
Given the need for police to make complicated judgments in what frequently is a very short period of time, the exigent circumstances doctrine requires courts to give some deference to the decisions of trained law enforcement officers in the field and thereby to avoid “‘unreasonable second-guessing’ of the officers’ assessment of the circumstances that they faced.” Figg v. Schroeder, 312 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2002)(quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S. Ct. 3304, 87 L. Ed. 2d 381 (1985)).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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