The court rejects a broad search term on defendant\u2019s supervised release because of his multiple arrests for driving on a suspended license. The search term doesn\u2019t serve any governmental interest. United States v. Postell, 917 F. Supp. 2d 687 (S.D. Ohio 2012).*<\/p>\n
The color of the vehicle the officers were looking for was close enough to the one stopped when they had reasonable suspicion; teal or green? Under the circumstances, they \u201cwould be remiss\u201d if they didn\u2019t stop it. United States v. Stile, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58266 (D. Me. January 2, 2013)*:<\/p>\n
In criminal investigations parlance, reasonable suspicion lies between “inarticulate hunches,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, which cannot justify investigatory stops, and probable cause, which can justify searches and arrests. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1979); Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273-74. “Reasonable suspicion, then, is an intermediate standard\u2014and one that defies precise definition.” Jones, 700 F.3d at 621 (quoting United States v. Chhien, 266 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001)). Much like the color teal, reasonable suspicion is best understood in reference to the more easily recognized standards it rests between.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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