A violation of state law does not make an arrest unreasonable per se. United States v. Laville, 48 V.I. 1012, 480 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007):<\/p>\n
Application of a per se rule could also lead to the creation of different standards governing arrests made by peace officers of different states for the same federal offense. Conceivably, fifty different constitutional standards of arrest, each one dictated by a respective state’s positive and decisional law, could result. What would be reasonable and constitutional in one state could be unreasonable and unconstitutional in another. Meanwhile, federal courts of appeals would be compelled to recognize–and, indeed, to perpetuate–such disparities among the states and territories within their jurisdictions. If, for instance, we were to uphold the District Court’s application of a per se rule here, we might nevertheless conclude, in some future case, that an otherwise identical arrest occurring in New Jersey is reasonable and constitutional. Such a patchwork of federal constitutional standards, arising as it were from the individual legislative enactments of the various states and territories, is inconsistent with our single federal constitution. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee<\/em>, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816) (noting “the importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution”).<\/p>\n
Moreover, a per se rule could well create disparity in the constitutionality of arrests performed by state and federal officers for the same offense within the same state or territory. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which officers of the VIPD and officers of the ICE, working on a joint law-enforcement detail, simultaneously approach a group of suspected illegal aliens under circumstances similar to those presented here. Acting on what they believe to be probable cause, a VIPD officer and an ICE officer make simultaneous, warrantless arrests. If we were to apply a per se rule, we would likely be compelled to find that the arrest made by the VIPD officer was unreasonable per se and, therefore, unconstitutional, whereas the identical arrest made by the ICE officer was reasonable and constitutional. The Fourth Amendment does not permit, much less require, any such thing.<\/p>\n
By engrafting territorial procedural requirements onto the federal constitutional standards governing seizure, the District Court went beyond simply determining the reasonableness of Laville’s arrest. Rather, the Court effectively required Santos to be certain that a misdemeanor had been committed, by virtue of having witnessed its commission, and to ensure that conviction was possible. A significant body of caselaw makes clear why any such requirements simply cannot be, and why a Fourth Amendment determination cannot turn on the exigencies of the law of a particular state or territory or an officer’s knowledge of the elements of a particular offense and whether each element has been satisfied. “The test is one of federal law, neither enlarged by what one state may have countenanced nor diminished by what another may have colorably suppressed.” Elkins v. United States,<\/em> 364 U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960). As the Supreme Court emphasized in Draper v. United States<\/em>, there is a “‘difference between what is required to prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or search.'” 358 U.S. 307, 311-12 (1959) (quoting Brinegar v. United States<\/em>, 338 U.S. 160, 173 (1949)). And, as Judge Learned Hand recognized more than sixty years ago, the “‘reasonable cause’ necessary to support an arrest cannot demand the same strictness of proof as the accused’s guilt upon a trial, unless the powers of peace officers are to be so cut down that they cannot possibly perform their duties.” United States v. Heitner<\/em>, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1945) (quoted in Draper<\/em>, 358 U.S. at 312 n.4); see also Graham v. Connor<\/em>, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989) (stating that in determining whether use of force violates the Fourth Amendment, “‘reasonableness’ … must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20\/20 vision of hindsight”).<\/p>\n
And it is reasonableness that is the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Williams<\/em>, 417 F.3d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 2005). “[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” Hill v. California,<\/em> 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971); see also Locke v. United States,<\/em> 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348, 3 L. Ed. 364 (1813) (recognizing that probable cause “means less than evidence which would justify condemnation”). Probable cause exists whenever reasonably trustworthy information or circumstances within an arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to conclude that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested. Draper<\/em>, 358 U.S. at 313; Myers<\/em>, 308 F.3d at 255.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Reasonable suspicion was based on the defendant’s drug history and apparent drug deals going on. Further detention for dog sniff was justified. United States v. Ramirez, 479 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2007).*<\/p>\n
Defendant on supervised release had the same rights of privacy in his girlfriend’s house that he would have in his own house. He was subject to searches, and there was reasonable suspicion. United States v. Taylor, 482 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2007):<\/p>\n
Taylor’s rights while on supervised release are more limited than those of the average citizen. In United States v. Knights,<\/em> 534 U.S. 112, 122 S. Ct. 587, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001), the Supreme Court considered the effect of a consent statement similar to the one here on the warrantless search of a probationer’s home. The Court declined to decide “whether Knights’ acceptance of the search condition constituted consent in the Schneckloth<\/em> sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights,” id. at 118, but instead determined that “the search of Knights<\/em> was reasonable under [the] general Fourth Amendment approach of examining the totality of circumstances with the probation search condition being a salient circumstance.” Id<\/em>. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). After weighing the effect of the probation condition on Knights’s privacy interest, the Court concluded that the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry “requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s house. The degree of individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of when there is sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest reasonable.” Id<\/em>. at 121.<\/p>\n
Presuming that Taylor was a houseguest, he was entitled to the same Fourth Amendment protections in his girlfriend’s apartment that he would have received in his own home. The question therefore, is whether there was a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct was occurring. In this case, unlike in Knights<\/em>, the police had a misdemeanor arrest warrant at the time they entered the house. They also had evidence suggesting that Taylor was in possession of a firearm and that he was in violation of the conditions of his parole. This evidence is sufficient to support a determination that the police had reasonable suspicion that Taylor may have been engaged in criminal conduct.<\/p>\n
This analysis does not address the question whether the police’s warrantless entry may have violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Katherine Johnson, who occupied the apartment as a resident. Taylor cannot, however, reasonably assert that his Fourth Amendment rights have been violated by this intrusion. Under the Knights test, the search would have been lawful, had it occurred in his home.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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