{"id":8085,"date":"2013-02-06T09:59:15","date_gmt":"2012-12-14T06:08:11","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2012-12-14T06:08:11","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=8085","title":{"rendered":"DC: Window tint stop and movement at dashboard didn’t add up to RS for Long<\/em> frisk of car"},"content":{"rendered":"

Defendant\u2019s car was stopped for too much tint, and the officer noted the car was rocking as he approached and there was movement toward the dashboard. When he got to the window he saw that the driver and passenger had switched, which they ultimately admitted because the original driver had no license. The officer got them out and handcuffed them and then did a Long frisk of the car finding cocaine in the steering wheel. The court finds the Long frisk without factual justification because, as dangerous as a traffic stop can be, this one showed all along that it wasn\u2019t risky and reasonable suspicion did not develop. Jackson v. United States<\/a>, 56 A.3d 1206 (D.C. 2012):<\/p>\n

The same is true here: there is a logical gap between Mr. Jackson\u2019s movement of his hands along the dashboard and the conclusion that police were confronting someone dangerous, and under our case law, \u201cthe ambiguous movement in this case cannot be the decisive fact justifying a frisk that was otherwise unwarranted.\u201d Powell, 649 A.2d at 1091 (Farrell, J., concurring); see also Page, 298 A.2d at 237 (\u201cFurtive movements standing alone would hardly warrant a search[.]\u201d). The overall calculus of factors in this case unquestionably varies from that in Spinner, and Spinner\u2019s holding that the search there violated the Fourth Amendment by no means dictates a like conclusion here. … Yet our view that the predominant factor in the trial court’s analysis in this case suffers from the same flaw as the gesture at issue in Spinner–namely, that it lacked specific indicia that it had something to do with grabbing or concealing a weapon–nevertheless becomes dispositive where the additional circumstances do not \u201creasonably warrant the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.\u201d Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

Officer Norris\u2019s observation that the van was rocking when he pulled it over was the other factor besides the movement of Mr. Jackson\u2019s hands on the dash that the trial court mentioned as having heightened the officer’s suspicion. … [W]e cannot ignore the reality that Officer Norris\u2019s concerns about the rocking van were largely dispelled when he immediately saw that the occupants had switched places and understood why the van had been rocking. Given these circumstances, and given that there is nothing about people switching places in a car that inherently suggests these people are armed and dangerous, we do not view this factor as meaningfully reinforcing the lawfulness of the search for weapons under Terry.<\/p>\n

It is beyond question that police officers face untold dangers when they conduct traffic stops. Our task, however, is to evaluate the individualized articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion in this case, and we would fail in that task if we were to quote Stanfield\u2019s unbridled language and perfunctorily conclude that the van\u2019s window tinting gave rise to reasonable suspicion in this case without checking that impulse against the facts of this case. …<\/p>\n

The stop in this case lacked many of the hallmarks of a particularly dangerous situation. The offense for which the officer stopped the van\u2014illegal window tinting\u2014was a minor one that prompted Officer Nelson to give Mr. Jackson only a verbal warning and to explain the law to him. …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

There is a dissent.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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