Officers executing a facially valid discovery order that required entry into property were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for that act. Moss v. Kopp, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11383 (D. Utah February 16, 2007):<\/p>\n
Defendants qualify for quasi-judicial immunity because they did not exceed their authority and acted pursuant to a facially valid court order. When properly invoked, quasi-judicial immunity serves as an absolute bar to recovery. Guttman v. Khalsa<\/em>, 446 F.3d 1027, 1033 (10th Cir. 2006)(“Absolute immunity bars suits for money damages for acts made in the exercise of prosecutorial or judicial discretion.”). As the Tenth Circuit has explained, “an official charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court order enjoys absolute immunity from liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed by that order.” Valdez v. City & County of Denver,<\/em> 878 F.2d 1285, 1286 (10th Cir. 1989).<\/p>\n
Quasi-judicial immunity springs from the protections which preclude civil liability for judges performing their official duties. Whitesel v. Sengenberger<\/em>, 222 F.3d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 2000)(“[A]bsolute judicial immunity has been extended to non-judicial officers where ‘their duties had an integral relationship with the judicial process.'”)(quoting Eades v. Sterlinske<\/em>, 810 F.2d 723, 726 (7th Cir. 1987)). While cloaking judges from liability, courts have recognized that judicial immunity must also extend to individuals charged with carrying out judicial orders. Valdez<\/em>, 878 F.2d at 1288 (“Absolute immunity for officials assigned to carry out a judge’s orders is necessary to insure that such officials can perform their function without the need to secure permanent legal counsel. A lesser degree of immunity could impair the judicial process.”). Because “it is simply unfair to spare the judges who give orders while punishing the officers who obey them,” courts recognize that “[o]fficials must not be called upon to answer for the legality of decisions which they are powerless to control.” Id.<\/em> at 1289. Otherwise, a narrow application of judicial immunity would “allow plaintiffs to bring suit any time a state agent executes a judicial order which does not fulfill every legal requirement [and] would make the agent ‘a lightning rod for harassing litigation aimed at judicial orders.'” Turney v. O’Toole,<\/em> 898 F.2d 1470, 1473 (10th Cir. 1990)(quoting Valdez<\/em>, 878 F.2d at 1289).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Pulling vehicles over was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff was an anti-abortion protest group, and the police pulled over a car and two trucks with anti-abortion messages on the side. The dress of those in the vehicles gave reasonable suspicion because they were wearing body armor and kevlar helmets. It was extended and became an arrest without probable cause. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Springboro, 477 F.3d 807 (6th Cir. 2007). As to reasonable suspicion:<\/p>\n
This initial seizure was proper in light of the Defendants’ reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Such a seizure is permissible where officers assess all the objective facts and circumstances, and that assessment “raise[s] a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.” United States v. Cortez,<\/em> 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). Here, Defendant Clark observed Plaintiffs driving box-style trucks while dressed in body armor and Kevlar helmets, accompanied by a vehicle modeled to look like a law enforcement car. This occurred in a post-9\/11 and post-Oklahoma City bombing context, at a time when law enforcement officers were in a heightened state of alert to fight would-be terrorists. When Clark initially made contact with Patch, he overheard Patch on the two-way radio telling Harrington the police were approaching him and observed him behaving in an “extremely nervous” manner. (J.A. at 421) Thus, specific and articulable facts gave rise to reasonable suspicion to stop Plaintiffs.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Federal courts lack jurisdiction to determinine enemy combatant status after Congress changed the law. Boumediene v. Bush, 375 U.S. App. D.C. 48, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007):<\/p>\n
Federal courts have no jurisdiction in these cases. In supplemental briefing after enactment of the DTA, the government asked us not only to decide the habeas jurisdiction question, but also to review the merits of the detainees’ designation as enemy combatants by their Combatant Status Review Tribunals. See DTA \u00a7 1005(e)(2). n15 The detainees objected to converting their habeas appeals to appeals from their Tribunals. In briefs filed after the DTA became law and after the Supreme Court decided Hamdan, they argued that we were without authority to do so. Even if we have authority to convert the habeas appeals over the petitioners’ objections, the record does not have sufficient information to perform the review the DTA allows. Our only recourse is to vacate the district courts’ decisions and dismiss the cases for lack of jurisdiction.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Civil suit against unlawful entry and excessive force styled as a substantive due process claim was dismissed under Albright v. Oliver<\/em> because it was a Fourth Amendment claim. McCracken v. Lancaster City Bur. of Police, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11471 (E.D. Pa. February 15, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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