{"id":787,"date":"2008-07-21T15:55:32","date_gmt":"2007-02-16T15:04:20","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2007-02-16T15:04:20","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=787","title":{"rendered":"Idaho adopts Sixth Circuit’s totality approach for standing of an unauthorized driver of a rental car"},"content":{"rendered":"

Idaho rejects a per se rule of no standing in an overdue rental car being driven by an unauthorized driver, instead opting for the totality standard of the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Smith,<\/em> 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001)). Under the facts here, the defendant’s connection to the vehicle was attenuated, and he had no standing on the totality. State v. Cutler<\/a>, 144 Idaho 272, 159 P.3d 909 (2007):<\/p>\n

The first approach, espoused by the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuit Courts, is a bright-line rule looking solely to the rental agreement. These circuit courts have determined that one driving or occupying a rental vehicle who is not the renter and is not authorized by the rental company to drive the vehicle, even if he or she has permission from a person who is an authorized driver, has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and consequently lacks standing to complain of the vehicle’s subjection to an allegedly unlawful search. See e.g., United States v. Jones<\/em>, 44 F.3d 860, 871 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wellons<\/em>, 32 F.3d 117, 119 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Boruff,<\/em> 909 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1990). See also State v. Pabillore<\/em>, 133 Idaho 650, 653, 991 P.2d 375, 378 (Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing the district court’s determination that the defendant did not have standing because he was not the renter or authorized driver of a rental vehicle was supported by numerous authorities). The circuit courts adopting this approach reason that because an unauthorized driver does not have a property or possessory interest in the car, the driver does not have an expectation of privacy in that car.<\/p>\n

Taking a modified view of the bright-line approach are the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts which generally do not allow standing unless an unauthorized driver can show he had permission from the authorized driver to use the vehicle. See e.g., United States v. Thomas<\/em>, 447 F.3d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Best<\/em>, 135 F.3d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Muhammad<\/em>, 58 F.3d 353, 355 (8th Cir. 1995). As the Ninth Circuit Court recognized in Thomas<\/em>, this approach essentially equates an unauthorized driver of a rental car with the non-owner driver of a privately owned car. Thomas<\/em>, 447 F.3d at 1197 (comparing the rental scenario to United States v. Portillo<\/em>, 633 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1980), which held that a non-owner has standing to challenge a search where he has “permission to use his friend’s automobile and the keys to the ignition and the trunk, with which he could exclude all others, save his friend, the owner”).<\/p>\n

Finally, the Sixth Circuit Court rejected a bright-line approach in favor of a totality of the circumstances inquiry. United States v. Smith<\/em>, 263 F.3d 571, 586 (6th Cir. 2001). While the court recognized a presumption that unauthorized drivers do not have standing to challenge a search, it determined that a “rigid test is inappropriate, given that we must determine whether [a defendant] had a legitimate expectation of privacy which was reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.” Id.<\/em> (citing Rakas<\/em>, 439 U.S. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring)). In lieu of sole reference to the rental agreement, the court considered several factors, including: (1) whether the defendant had a driver’s license; (2) the relationship between the unauthorized driver and the lessee; (3) the driver’s ability to present rental documents; (4) whether the driver had the lessee’s permission to use the car; and (5) the driver’s relationship with the rental company.<\/p>\n

Given the increasingly common utilization of rental vehicles for a myriad of purposes and our view that a bright line rule fails to address the ensuing complexities, we are convinced the Sixth Circuit Court’s totality of the circumstances approach best addresses the issue. In Smith<\/em>, the Court confronted a scenario where an officer had pulled over a rental vehicle driven by Smith. The only authorized driver listed on the rental agreement, which Smith provided to the officer, was Smith’s wife who was not present. After a subsequent search uncovered drugs, the government contested Smith’s standing to challenge the legitimacy of the search given his status as an unauthorized driver. The Sixth Circuit Court began its analysis by acknowledging that as a general rule, an unauthorized driver of a rental vehicle does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle. However, the Court declined to be constrained by an absolute maxim and instead proceeded with a totality of the circumstances inquiry to determine whether the circumstances surrounding Smith’s occupation of the vehicle warranted finding, in essence, an exception.<\/p>\n

…<\/p>\n

In contrast, the instant case presents considerably more attenuated relationships among Cutler, the authorized driver, and the rental company, such that there are insufficient facts to overcome the general presumption that unauthorized drivers lack standing. There was no evidence presented regarding the relationship between Cutler and Hernandez, the only authorized driver–including whether they even knew each other. Accordingly, there was no evidence that Cutler even had permission from the only authorized driver to operate the vehicle. And while Hernandez had given Stewart permission to use the car, there was no indication regarding the scope of that permission–most importantly, there was no evidence as to whether Hernandez’s permission to Stewart encompassed consent for Stewart himself to lend the vehicle. In addition to not having a relationship with the authorized renter of the car, Cutler also did not have a relationship with Budget (quite unlike the Smith’s de facto renter status). Furthermore, not only was Cutler’s name absent from the rental agreement, but the agreement had expired, making even Hernandez’s possession of the car in contravention of the contract. It is the totality of these factors that preclude us from deviating, in this case, from the general rule that unauthorized drivers of rental vehicles do not enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in such vehicles. Thus, Cutler may not challenge the subsequent search of the vehicle.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Officer validly stopped defendant’s vehicle for traffic offense, and photos in the record supported the plain view of marijuana. United States v. Garcia, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95251 (D. Ariz. December 15, 2006).*<\/p>\n

Maryland holds that stop of defendant that was arguably illegal, and conceded to be such for the purposes of the appeal, based on the officer’s suspicion that the defendant loosely fit the description of a wanted man, did not require suppression of the finding of an another arrest warrant for that person. The court applied Brown v. Illinois.<\/em> Cox v. State, 397 Md. 200, 916 A.2d 311 (2007):<\/p>\n

We reject Petitioner’s contention as to this point and again agree with the State. As we stated supra, even if the police officer’s initial encounter with Petitioner was illegal, that fact would not be dispositive at this stage in our analysis. In Myers v. State<\/em>, we analyzed the impact of an outstanding arrest warrant on an arguably unlawful stop by police officers and the application of the three factors under Brown for determining whether the causal connection had been sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegal conduct. In Myers<\/em>, a case factually similar to the case, sub judice, we held that, assuming arguendo, the initial stop by the police of Myers’s vehicle was illegal, the officer’s discovery of the outstanding warrant and arrest of Myers pursuant to that warrant was sufficient to remove the taint of the initial stop such that the subsequent search of Myers and his vehicle were lawful. In addition, we acknowledged that some of the evidence was seized almost immediately after the arrest, whereas some was seized some time later after the officer obtained the additional warrants. We reasoned, however, as the State asserts, in the instant case, that “the question of timing is not dispositive on the issue of taint, especially because there was an outstanding arrest warrant discovered between the initial stop and the subsequent search incident to the arrest, even though some of the evidence was discovered shortly after the illegal stop.” Further, we explained that the discovery of the warrant for Myers’s arrest constituted an intervening circumstance or cause that attenuated the taint of the illegal stop. Ultimately, we looked to the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s conduct and determined that the purpose of the stop “was not to effectuate the arrest of Myers on an outstanding warrant or to search his vehicle. Merely because Officer Weikert’s stop of Myers was determined to be invalid does not mean that his conduct was flagrant.” Myers<\/em>, 395 Md. at 293, 909 A.2d at 1067. Instead, we concluded that the officer stopped Myers because of what he thought was suspicious activity — speeding. Once he discovered an outstanding warrant, the officer “gained an independent and intervening reason to arrest and search Myers.” Therefore, we held that the lawful arrest and search of Myers attenuated the taint of the illegal stop and the evidence was admissible.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

Broken headlight stop was valid, and reasonable suspicion existed that the occupants were involved in an arson. Because they had reasonable suspicion, the fact the stop lasted 34 minutes did not make it unreasonable. State v. Luers, 211 Ore. App. 34, 153
\nP.3d 688 (2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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