The defendant was observed by a drug surveillance team doing drug sales in Manhattan, and he was arrested. Because the officers testified to experiencing a significant number of arrestees hiding drugs in their anus, it was reasonable to strip search the arrestee here. People v Hall, 2007 NY Slip Op 1015, 39 A.D.3d 100, 829 N.Y.S.2d 85 (1st Dept. 2007):<\/p>\n
In Mitchell<\/em>, this Court applied the standard enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish<\/em>, under which the reasonableness of searches must be determined by considering (1) the scope of the intrusion, (2) the manner in which the search is conducted, (3) the justification for initiating the search, and (4) the place in which the search is conducted (see<\/em> 441 U.S. at 559). Applying those criteria to the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the visual body cavity search initially conducted here was justified and reasonable. While the scope of the intrusion is substantial in view of the degrading nature of the procedure, the manner and place of the search were reasonable, and, importantly, the visual body cavity search procedure was justified by the facts known to the police, including their experiences with the common practices of drug sellers in the neighborhood, and the officer’s observation of defendant selling drugs, packaged in small packets, during which the seller had to temporarily retreat to an unseen spot prior to completing the transaction in order to retrieve the goods he sold.<\/p>\n
As we observed in Mitchell<\/em> (2 A.D.3d at 148), some courts have applied the “reasonable suspicion” standard enunciated in Weber v. Dell<\/em> to station house strip searches incident to arrest, requiring “reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing a weapon or other contraband.” We need do no more here than note that even if that standard were determined to be applicable in this context, it was satisfied by the evidence here.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Officer’s claim that emergency existed because person in house was sleep deprived from meth abuse was not an emergency justifying an entry into the house. State v. Baca, 2007 NMCA 16, 141 N.M. 65, 150 P.3d 1015 (2006):<\/p>\n
[*28] We recognize that officers in the field are confronted with a wide variety of situations in which the welfare of an occupant of a residence may be in question. There may be an element of uncertainty and the facts may not be entirely clear. In some situations, danger may be more apparent; police may hear screams, or threats of violence, and the need for immediate intervention may be more readily apparent. See, e.g., State v. Drennan, 278 Kan. 704, 101 P.3d 1218, 1232-33 (Kan. 2004) (holding entry was justified where police knew of prior history of domestic violence between the defendant and his live-in girlfriend, a neighbor reported hearing an argument, a woman scream, and then silence, no one responded when the officer knocked at the door, and when the defendant finally appeared he was unresponsive to questions and refused to say where his girlfriend was). See generally LaFave, supra, \u00a7 6.6(a), at 458-59 n.28 (collecting cases). There may also be tangible evidence suggesting serious bodily injury or serious illness requiring immediate attention. See id. But this case does not present those facts. Rather, the evidence is consistent with Officer Chaves’ initial assessment that the situation involved someone suffering from sleep deprivation resulting from methamphetamine use, which, we assume, was an assessment different from drug overdose. This is insufficient to establish an emergency. And, as we have discussed, the evidence does not permit a rational inference that Defendant was suffering from a drug overdose circumstance that required immediate intervention.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant’s conduct was essentially innocuous, and did not support an inference of criminality that led to his frisk. State v. Rivas, 2007 NMCA 20, 141 N.M. 87, 150 P.3d 1037 (2006):<\/p>\n
[*13] In the present case, the circumstances regarding officer safety are less compelling than in Jason L. Here, there was no testimony supporting the likely presence of weapons other than the officer’s bare assertion that “[u]sually where there are drugs, we find guns.” The parties did not ask the officer whether this was true even in the case of possession of a small quantity of marijuana, as was found here, as opposed to trafficking scenarios involving large quantities of drugs. We observe that in Patterson, companions of both defendants were found to possess drugs before the defendants were searched, and this did not lead to an automatic conclusion that the searches were justified because guns were likely to be present. Even if Officer Marion’s assertion could be shown to be generally true, it does not amount to individualized suspicion that Defendant, on whom drugs had not yet been found, had committed or was about to commit a crime.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Window tint stop was complete when the defendant offered, without any request, to allow the officer to search his car, so the search was by consent. State v. Trujillo, 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 221 (February 6, 2007).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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