{"id":6815,"date":"2012-03-13T07:04:44","date_gmt":"2012-03-13T07:04:44","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2012-03-13T07:04:44","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=6815","title":{"rendered":"M.D.N.C.: Traffic stop with frisk is not enough to invoke <em>Miranda<\/em>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>Just because a motorist is stopped with flashing lights, frisked, and put in a police car, that does not make it a \u201ccustodial interrogation\u201d for Miranda purposes under <a href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=1340354395100305765&amp;q=Berkemer+v.+McCarty&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,4\">Berkemer<\/a>. United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31918 (M.D. N.C. March 7, 2012):<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>When police question a suspect outside of a police station environment, however, \u201cMiranda is not triggered simply because a person detained by the police has reasonable cause to believe that he is not free to leave.\u201d United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 961 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109 (4th Cir. 1995) (\u201c[T]he perception &#8230; that one is not free to leave is insufficient to convert a Terry stop into an arrest.\u201d (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987))). The \u201cfree to leave\u201d standard, without more, determines whether an individual is \u201cseized\u201d within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment such that any evidence uncovered during a search conducted without a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot must be excluded. United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002) (\u201c[A] \u2018seizure\u2019 warranting protection of the Fourth Amendment occurs when &#8230; a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or otherwise terminate the encounter.\u201d).<\/p>\n<p>The fact that a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, therefore, does not necessarily mean that he is \u201cin custody\u201d within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1405 (5th Cir. 1992) (\u201c[A]lthough a temporary Fourth Amendment seizure may have occurred . . ., a Fifth Amendment custodial situation did not.\u201d). Instead, the court must consider a \u201chost of factors\u201d in deciding whether the suspect\u2019s freedom of action has been curtailed to \u201ca degree associated with formal arrest.\u201d Streifel, 781 F.2d at 961 (citation omitted). Those factors include the location of the questioning, the number of officers present, the degree of physical restraint exercised over the defendant, and the duration and character of the interrogation. United States v. Teemer, 394 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2005).<\/p>\n<p>Applying these factors in the context of a traffic stop, the Supreme Court in <a href=\"http:\/\/scholar.google.com\/scholar_case?case=1340354395100305765&amp;q=Berkemer+v.+McCarty&amp;hl=en&amp;as_sdt=2,4\">Berkemer v. McCarty<\/a>, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), held that an individual subject to a routine traffic stop is not entitled to Miranda warnings prior to police questioning. According to the Court, routine traffic stops are \u201cpresumptively temporary and brief,\u201d in contrast to station-house interrogations which can extend indefinitely. Id. at 437-38. In addition, the public nature of most traffic stops, coupled with the small number of police officers typically involved, indicate that \u201cthe atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less \u2018police dominated\u2019 than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself.\u201d Id. at 438-39.<\/p>\n<p>Here, Hernandez-Rodriguez\u2019s vehicle was stopped for a clear traffic violation, and there is no indication that the trooper\u2019s questions or the atmosphere of the encounter were coercive. &#8230;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>b2evALnk.b2WPAutP <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=6815\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"pingsdone","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6815","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6815","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=6815"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6815\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=6815"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=6815"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=6815"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}