Whether or not the parole officer violated the parole officer\u2019s field manual really doesn\u2019t matter if the search otherwise complied with the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Wade, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11552 (N.D. Ga. January 31, 2012).*<\/p>\n
Plaintiff was a potential suspect under the suspect exception of the Privacy Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000aa(a)(1)<\/a>. Her status as a photojournalist did not automatically protect her under the Act. Sennett v. United States<\/a>, 667 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished).<\/p>\n The trial court\u2019s incomplete findings of fact left the appellate court unsure how it was applying the facts in crediting defendant (no violations of the law) or the officer (three traffic offenses). The fact that the trial court applied a reasonable suspicion standard rather than a probable cause standard suggested either that the trial court misapplied the law or disbelieved some or all of defendant\u2019s testimony. The law that applied depended upon whose version of the events was to be believed, and the trial court failed to make any credibility determinations in the first instance. State v. Payne<\/a>, 2012 Ohio 305, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 247 (9th Dist. January 30, 2012).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading