{"id":6594,"date":"2012-03-08T07:49:16","date_gmt":"2012-01-27T11:03:32","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2012-01-27T11:03:32","slug":"en-US","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=6594","title":{"rendered":"CA8: Burden on plaintiff in \u00a7 1983 action for a warrantless arrest or search to disprove exceptions"},"content":{"rendered":"

Eighth Circuit joins majority of circuits and holds that the plaintiff in a \u00a7 1983 action for a warrantless arrest or search bears the burden of production, proof, and persuasion that no exception applies. [Omitted is fn.2 with a lot of citations.] Der v. Connolly<\/a>, 666 F.3d 1120 (8th Cir. 2012):<\/p>\n

Instead, as the district court correctly noted, this court \u201chas not expressly decided who bears the burden of proof in a \u00a7 1983 action for a warrantless arrest or search.\u201d Der, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112748, 2011 WL 31498, at *2. We do so now. Two views currently prevail among our sister circuits. A majority of the circuits place the burden of proof on the plaintiff in a \u00a7 1983 action for a warrantless arrest or search, with some of those circuits imposing the burden of production on the defendant. A minority of the circuits place the burden of proof on the defendant in a \u00a7 1983 action. See, e.g., Armijo ex rel. Armijo Sanchez v. Peterson, 601 F.3d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating, in the context of a \u00a7 1983 action, \u201c[t]he officers bear the burden of establishing that the threats posed exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry\u201d); Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp., 461 F.3d 646, 655 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding the government bears the burden of proving the presence of exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry); Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d 707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996) (\u201cTo excuse the absence of a warrant, the burden rests on the State to show the existence of [exigent circumstances].\u201d); Tarter v. Raybuck, 742 F.2d 977, 980-81 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that school officials bore the burden of demonstrating a student\u2019s voluntary relinquishment of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches in light of the \u201cpresumption against the waiver of constitutional rights\u201d); Losch v. Borough of Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 909 (3d Cir. 1984) (commenting that, in a \u00a7 1983 action for malicious prosecution, the \u201cdefendants bear the burden at trial of proving the defense of good faith and probable cause\u201d).<\/p>\n

Having reviewed the relevant case authority, we agree with the majority of our sister circuits\u2019 \u201cformulation of the proper allocation of the parties\u2019 burdens in a section 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation.\u201d Valance, 110 F.3d at 1279. We have previously recognized that \u201cplaintiffs ordinarily retain the burden of proof throughout the trial\u201d in a suit \u201cbrought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983.\u201d Clark v. Mann, 562 F.2d 1104, 1117 (8th Cir. 1977). Thus, \u201cemploying a criminal burden of proof [in a \u00a7 1983 civil action] is contrary to established principles governing civil trials, namely, that the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion must remain squarely on the plaintiff.\u201d Bogan, 644 F.3d at 570 (quotations and citations omitted). As the Seventh Circuit explained, \u201c[e]ven if a presumption of unreasonableness arises from the fact of a warrantless search [or entry], that does not serve in a civil case to shift \u2018the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion.\u2019\u201d Valance, 110 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 301). Instead, such \u201cpresumption merely serves to impose on the defendant \u2018the burden of going forward with evidence to meet or rebut the presumption.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 301). A defendant may satisfy this burden of production by \u201cproduc[ing] evidence of consent or of some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement.\u201d Id. at 1278. \u201cYet once the defendant has done so, \u2018the ultimate risk of nonpersuasion must remain squarely on the plaintiff in accordance with established principles governing civil trials.\u2019\u201d Id. (quoting Ruggiero, 928 F.2d at 563).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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