{"id":65219,"date":"2026-11-19T10:24:52","date_gmt":"2026-11-19T15:24:52","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=65219"},"modified":"2026-11-19T10:24:52","modified_gmt":"2026-11-19T15:24:52","slug":"wi-after-suppression-how-does-the-independent-source-rule-work-to-salvage-the-search-or-does-it","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=65219","title":{"rendered":"WI: After suppression, how does the independent source rule work to salvage the search? Or does it?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>After a warrant for electronics was suppressed, a second was obtained with the same evidence claiming independent source. The Court of Appeals is so troubled by this that it certifies the case to the Supreme Court to sort it out. State v. Lancial, 2026 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1248 (Nov. 17, 2026)* (a fascinating opinion, but not yet on court&#8217;s website):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<!--more-->\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p>The State&#8217;s reliance on the independent source doctrine here is unique for the following reasons: (1) the source of the evidence is a cell phone that was continuously in law enforcement&#8217;s possession; (2) police sought a second search of the exact same phone searched the first time, for the exact same evidence that was uncovered during the first search, using the exact same probable cause; (3) the search came after the defendant had already been tried and convicted of the crime of possession of child pornography; and (4) the evidence giving rise to that conviction was ordered suppressed by an appellate court. Accordingly, we question whether the evidence obtained was truly from an independent source or whether the State&#8217;s actions reveal an untenable constitutional loophole to the exclusionary rule. This is a question of statewide importance because if the independent source doctrine applies under these circumstances, it is likely that the State will utilize this procedure in future cases. Therefore, litigants, attorneys, and lower courts throughout the state would benefit greatly from a definitive decision on the issue by the state&#8217;s highest court.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In order to answer the above question regarding the independent source doctrine, however, we believe it is important to first consider whether, as Lancial claims, law enforcement&#8217;s affidavit for the second search failed to include sufficient facts to support a finding of probable cause to believe that his cell phone contained evidence of the crime of possession of child pornography or whether, given the significant privacy interest that the case law recognizes in modern cell phones, police had no legal basis\u2014separate from the residence where the phone was found\u2014to search his cell phone. And, relatedly, we must also consider whether the circuit court&#8217;s order authorizing the search was erroneous because it failed to specifically identify the device being searched and allowed a broad search of the device without identifying the nature of the evidence sought and its nexus to the crime of possession of child pornography.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The State, in contrast, asserts that the search warrant affidavit contained enough information for the circuit court to make separate and independent inferences in support of probable cause, that a reasonable officer conducting the search would be able to discern the crime at issue and the evidence sought, and that the affidavit and the order can be considered together to create the necessary basis for a probable cause finding and nexus to the crime. Accordingly, the State argues, the court did not err by denying Lancial&#8217;s motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the second search. Thus, this case presents an important, novel, and active legal question regarding the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit and the scope of an order authorizing the seizure of the contents of a cell phone and the search of those contents, particularly where the crime being investigated might necessitate an extensive search of the digital device.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If it is determined that the search warrant affidavit lacked sufficient evidence to demonstrate probable cause to seize and search the contents of Lancial&#8217;s phone, and that the circuit court&#8217;s resulting order to search the cell phone failed the particularity requirement, then those facts weigh on whether the independent source doctrine was correctly applied. Lancial contends that absent the first unlawful search and the evidence it uncovered, the State would not have sought a second search of his cell phone. Relatedly, and given the deficiencies in the supporting affidavit and the court&#8217;s order, he contends that the court would not have authorized the second search but for its knowledge of the first search and its results. Thus, the second search did not genuinely result from an independent source, but was instead a search tainted by the results of the first search.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>And, finally, in the alternative, we question whether all of the above considerations are eclipsed by application of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In other words, regardless of whether the independent source doctrine was properly applied, the affidavit was insufficient, and the order was impermissibly overbroad, or whether the law of the case should control to suppress the evidence, would the good-faith exception apply? And if it did, would its application effectively swallow the exclusionary rule? Accordingly, we certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>After a warrant for electronics was suppressed, a second was obtained with the same evidence claiming independent source. The Court of Appeals is so troubled by this that it certifies the case to the Supreme Court to sort it out. &hellip; <a class=\"more-link\" href=\"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/?p=65219\">Continue reading <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[60],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-65219","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-independent-source"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65219","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=65219"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65219\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":65220,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/65219\/revisions\/65220"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=65219"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=65219"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/fourthamendment.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=65219"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}