Considering that reasonable suspicion is less than a preponderance of the evidence, a 911 caller who left her number but not name was sufficient where it related first hand information. United States v. Collier, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138645 (D. Kan. December 2, 2011)*:<\/p>\n
(1) the informant lacked \u201ctrue anonymity\u201d since she had provided her telephone number to the police; (2) the informant was reporting contemporaneous first-hand knowledge of the events as they were transpiring; (3) the informant’s motivation was to prevent her neighbor’s house from being burglarized; and (4) the police corroborated some of the informant’s information, such as the reported information that the two men on the property were driving a white van that was pulling a trailer. The tip also provided sufficient information that criminal conduct was occurring or was about to occur. The court reaches this conclusion with the thought that the level of suspicion required for reasonable suspicion is considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Defendant was stopped for following too close, and he easily consented to a search when his travel plans didn\u2019t make sense. The search revealed a hidden compartment and 6 kg of cocaine. United States v. Jimenez<\/a>, 446 Fed. Appx. 771, 2011 FED App. 0802N (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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