Just because the state seizes a cell phone doesn\u2019t mean they know the Brady implications of the contents. Moss v. Jeffreys, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45716 (D. Neb. Mar. 4, 2026) (\u00a7 60.58 n.2)<\/p>\n\n\n\n
2255 petitioner\u2019s claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a motion to suppress the search of his cell phone is denied because defense counsel did litigate one. Smith v. United States, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45698 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 9, 2026).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Plaintiff\u2019s complaint he was unreasonably seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment doesn\u2019t satisfy the Rule 8 \u201cshort, plain statement\u201d of facts that show a seizure. Keith v. Romain, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45625 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2026).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The affidavit for search warrant for defendant\u2019s cell phone was based on probable cause, and, even if it wasn\u2019t, the good faith exception applies. United States v. Rondon-Perez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45833 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2026).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Just because the state seizes a cell phone doesn\u2019t mean they know the Brady implications of the contents. Moss v. Jeffreys, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45716 (D. Neb. Mar. 4, 2026) (\u00a7 60.58 n.2) 2255 petitioner\u2019s claim that defense counsel … Continue reading