A federal contractor consented to record of employees of alleged discrimination by responding to a subpoena without challenging it. United Space Alliance, LLC v. Solis, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130938 (D. D.C. November 14, 2011):<\/p>\n
United Space next argues that the OFCCP request for additional data violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. This constitutional protection applies to administrative inspections as well as criminal investigations. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 18 L. Ed. 2d 930 (1967). It extends to places of business as well as private homes. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967). Administrative warrants and subpoenas must both comport with the Fourth Amendment, although different standards apply to each. For an administrative warrant to issue, the government must have either \u201cspecific evidence of an existing violation\u201d or the ability to show that \u201creasonable legislative or administrative standards\u201d such as \u201ca general administrative plan … derived from neutral sources\u201d justify the warrant. Marshall v. Barlow\u2019s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320, 321, 98 S. Ct. 1816, 56 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such a showing satisfies the constitutional requirement that \u201cno Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,\u201d U.S. CONST. amend. IV, however \u201c[p]robable cause in the criminal law sense is not required\u201d to justify an administrative warrant. Barlow\u2019s, 436 U.S. at 320. The standard set out in Barlow\u2019s applies whenever \u201cgovernment inspectors [attempt] to make nonconsensual entries into areas not open to the public,\u201d Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S. Ct. 769, 78 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1984), and ensures that \u201cthe decision to enter and inspect will not be the product of the unreviewed discretion of the enforcement officer in the field.\u201d See, 387 U.S. at 545.<\/p>\n
\u201c[T]he enforceability of [an] administrative subpoena,\u201d on the other hand, \u201cis governed, not by [the Court\u2019s] decision in Barlow\u2019s … but rather by [its] decision in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 66 S. Ct. 494, 90 L. Ed. 614 (1946).\u201d Lone Steer, 464 U.S. at 414. Under Oklahoma Press and its progeny, \u201cwhen an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the Fourth Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.\u201d Id. at 415 (quoting See, 387 U.S. at 544). This line of cases holds administrative subpoenas to a considerably lower standard than administrative warrants\u2014a standard that notably focuses on the breadth of the subpoena rather than the motivation for its issuance. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652, 70 S. Ct. 357, 94 L. Ed. 401 (1950) (\u201cEven if one were to regard the request for information … as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the public interest.\u201d). \u201cThe gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.\u201d Id. at 652-53 (1950) (quoting Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 208); see also Lone Steer, 464 U.S. at 415. This line of cases \u201cin no way leaves an employer defenseless against an unreasonably burdensome administrative subpoena requiring the production of documents.\u201d Lone Steer, 464 U.S. at 415. Rather, it \u201cprovide[s] protection for a subpoenaed employer by allowing him to question the reasonableness of the subpoena, before suffering any penalties for refusing to comply with it, by raising objections in an action in district court.\u201d Id.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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