Defendant\u2019s consent to search his car could only be understood to be for \u201cdrug activity,\u201d and that implicitly permitted a search of his cell phone under that consent. United States v. Gilbert, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124235 (W.D. Mo. September 30, 2011)* [Like the defendant would remotely understand that; another fiction].<\/p>\n
Officers came to defendant\u2019s apartment at night on a report he had a gun and asked about it under the public safety exception to Miranda. He said there was a gun inside and told them where it was. The officers were able to ascertain that there were no others in the apartment, so the entry into the apartment to seize the gun was an unreasonable warrantless entry into the home. United States v. Simmons<\/a>, 661 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2011).*<\/p>\n Defendant\u2019s reliance on Gant in his 2255 was without any basis. United States v. Hamilton, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123346 (D. N.J. October 25, 2011).*<\/p>\n The inventory of defendant\u2019s car was clearly within the local PD\u2019s inventory policy. United States v. Crawford, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123973 (S.D. Ohio October 26, 2011).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading