The collective knowledge doctrine does not apply to information not communicated. Here, there was information in a computer of other investigating officers who had not communicated with the searching officers, and defendant\u2019s argument takes the collective knowledge doctrine too far. Here, that doctrine is used against the defendant arguing it. United States v. Cribbs, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112559 (W.D. Tenn. September 29, 2011):<\/p>\n
In the present case, the Dyer County Sheriff’s Office had knowledge of Defendant’s order of protection as evidenced by the entry of the order into the office’s information systems. Defendant contends that the office’s knowledge of the order should be imputed to the Dyer County Sheriff investigators who conducted the search of 473 Cribbs Road. Defendant seeks to extend the imputed knowledge theory too far. Unlike the cases above in which the collective knowledge of the investigating officers was imputed to individual officers, Defendant asks the Court to impute knowledge of information contained in a law enforcement database to officers conducting an investigation in the field. Defendant has not provided any case law that supports such an application of the imputed knowledge doctrine, nor has the Court found any.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
On de novo review, the appellate court read the transcript of the suppression hearing and finds probable cause for his arrest. United States v. Trappier<\/a>, 447 Fed. Appx. 463 (4th Cir. 2011) (unpublished).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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