\u201cI find that Mercado\u2019s statement \u2018You can check it if you want,\u2019 constituted an express invitation to police to search the entire vehicle, including its trunk. However, Mercado argues that his consent to the search was involuntary because he was not informed that he had a right to refuse consent, and he provided consent only when surrounded by \u2018significant police presence including [a] police dog.\u2019\u201d There is no right to know one can refuse, and the dog apparently wasn\u2019t there at the time. Nevertheless, under First Circuit authority, consent in the face of a police dog isn\u2019t coerced per se. United States v. Mercado, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97262 (D. Mass. August 30, 2011).*<\/p>\n
A motion to reconsider can be entertained in criminal cases, but this one was just a rehash of the first argument and was denied. United States v. Murry, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96934 (E.D. Wash. August 29, 2011).*<\/p>\n
The officer stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle for lack of license plates and no working lights. After running defendant\u2019s DL, he told him he was free to go but the car was being impounded. \u201cRegardless of defendant\u2019s concern regarding leaving his vehicle unattended, there appears to be no dispute that he was told he was free to leave, and chose not to do so. The evidence at this point was that Officer Hilburn was suspicious about the condition of the vehicle, given that it was full of debris and did not look as though it had just been purchased. It was also his testimony that he had observed the vehicle leaving a residence where drug transactions were known to occur.\u201d Then the officer noticed that the passenger seemed to be under the influence of drugs. The call for the drug dog was reasonable. United States v. Stringer, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97195 (W.D. Mo. July 20, 2011), adopted 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97162 (W.D. Mo. August 30, 2011).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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