False representations by defendant\u2019s wife, who was secretly working with the police, that if he did not consent, she was going to jail, which was false, vitiated defendant\u2019s consent. United States v. Strange, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94094 (W.D. Mo. August 23, 2011):<\/p>\n
This Court further finds that the United States has not met its burden of proving beyond a preponderance of evidence that Paul Strange voluntarily consented to a search of his house. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). The record demonstrates that Vikki Strange falsely informed Paul Strange, within hearing of police, that police would take Vikki Strange and her mother (also Paul Strange’s mother) to jail if Paul Strange did not consent to the search. Where, as here, a suspect consents to a search in reliance upon promises or misrepresentations made by the police (or their agents), that weighs against a finding of voluntariness. See United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1990). The United States has failed to produce convincing evidence that this misrepresentation did not lead to Paul Strange’s consent, or that this consent was, in its totality, voluntary.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\u201cDo what he wanted to do\u201d was consent under the circumstances. United States v. Kale, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94342 (S.D. Fla. February 26, 2011), adopted 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93966 (S.D. Fla. August 23, 2011).<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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