The prosecution conceded that the search of defendant\u2019s house violated the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, his confession 30 days later was valid because time \u201cpurged the taint.\u201d Stevens v. People, 55 V.I. 1083 (V.I. App. St. Croix 2011) (three judge panel):<\/p>\n
Here, Stevens\u2019 confession was neither in close physical nor temporal proximity to the illegal search. The illegal search occurred at Stevens\u2019 residence. Stevens confessed at a police station. The confession occurred over thirty days after the illegal search. Hence, considerable time and distance attenuated the illegal search and Stevens\u2019 confession. See Maroney, 348 F.2d at 22, 30 (confession obtained five days after Fourth Amendment violation did not have the taint of the poisonous tree); compare Rivera-Padilla, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 3125 (confession obtained five hours after the illegal search and without Miranda warning was tainted by Fourth Amendment violation).<\/p>\n
The second inquiry calls into question whether intervening circumstances sufficiently purged the primary taint. See, e.g., Brown, 422 U.S. at 602 (emphasis added); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988). The test is holistic. Brown, 422 U.S. at 602. No single fact is dispositive. Id. The \u201c\u2019workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse\u2019 to allow for an overly technical rule premised on one overriding factor.\u201d Id. at 604. Thus, the question whether a confession is the product of free will must be answered on the facts of each case. Id. at 603.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading