The government was investigating the defendant for white collar crime operated out of his home office, and Brackinreed was a trusted employee with access to everything. The government debriefed Brackinreed, and he produced papers he smuggled from defendant. He later gave consent to enter a storage building with records that he had full access to and the key. His days were numbered with defendant, but defendant had done nothing to cut him off from the files, storage unit, or computers. Brackinreed had the ability to consent even though defendant had an expectation of privacy. United States v. Leiske, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82535 (D. Ore. July 27, 2011).*<\/p>\n
The officer\u2019s stop of defendant for a temporary tag was a mistake of fact not of law. While a real temporary tag from Texas was valid in Alabama, it looked fabricated to the officer. United States v. DeJesus<\/a>, 435 Fed. Appx. 895 (11th Cir. 2011)* [Now police can claim that the temporary tag looked fake.]<\/p>\n Reading the transcript of the suppression hearing, the court is amply sure that defendant consented to a search of his car. That general consent to search the car permitted looking inside bags. United States v. Cunningham<\/a>, 441 Fed. Appx. 209 (4th Cir. 2011).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" b2evALnk.b2WPAutP Continue reading