The failure of a state trial judge to sign a search warrant was mere ministerial or clerical act. While it may have violated Massachusetts law, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment and the warrant clearly issued as the issuing judge intended. United States v. Lyons, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78931 (D. Mass. July 19, 2011):<\/p>\n
Signs point to the warrant being valid. \u201c[T]he text of the Fourth Amendment demands that a warrant be \u2018issue[d].\u2019 Issuance serves to demonstrate that a neutral and detached magistrate has reviewed the warrant application and affidavit and made an independent and objective determination that probable cause exists to justify the search.\u201d United States v. Evans<\/a>, 469 F. Supp. 2d 893, 897 (D. Mont. 2007) (internal citations omitted). \u201cIssuing a warrant is not synonymous with signing a warrant.\u201d United States v. Hondras, 296 F.3d 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2002). Indeed, where a warrant is unsigned, it is still validly \u201cissued\u201d as long as there exists \u201csome indication that the search is officially authorized.\u201d Evans<\/a>, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 897; see also United States v. Jackson<\/a>, 617 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (\u201c[S]igning a search warrant is just one of a number of methods that an issuing authority may use to signal that the warrant complies with the Fourth Amendment\u2019s probable cause requirement.\u201d); Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d) (requiring magistrate\u2019s signature only for telephonic warrants).<\/p>\n
Other United States District Courts have suggested that the following can constitute indicia of issuance: (1) an indication on the warrant of the date before which the search must be conducted, (2) the presence of a case number indicating that the warrant has been filed, (3) the presence of the issuing authority\u2019s initials or other imprimaturs of judicial authority on the warrant, and (4) an in-person acknowledgment by the issuing authority to the affiant that probable cause has been found.<\/p>\n
Jackson<\/a>, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 321. The Second Circuit has viewed signatures on warrants as \u201cpurely ministerial\u201d and not required by the Fourth Amendment. Turner, 558 F.2d at 50 (holding that magistrate\u2019s delegating task of signing warrant to subordinate did not violate Fourth Amendment, and \u201c[a]s long as the magistrate in fact performs the substantive tasks of determining probable cause and authorizing the issuance of the warrant, the amendment is satisfied\u201d).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Here, the primary indicator of the state court judge\u2019s intent to issue the warrant is the fact that he signed the warrant application and affidavit, as well as his post-hoc explanation in the re-execution order that the failure to sign the warrant was an administrative oversight. …<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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