\u201cCounsel did not perform deficiently when they raised the Fourth Amendment argument [under applicable law at the time], even though this Court and the Seventh Circuit found that the good faith applied.\u201d Castro-Aguirre v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95954 (S.D. Ind. May 29, 2024).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cHowever, \u2018the exclusionary rule does not apply in federal supervised release revocation proceedings.\u2019 \u2026 Because the evidence challenged by Faucette was considered in a revocation proceeding, not a criminal prosecution, Armstrong forecloses his constitutional challenge to the evidence supporting the revocation of his supervised release.\u201d United States v. Faucette, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 12989 (4th Cir. May 30, 2024).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Defendant was a codefendant in a 77-count indictment, and she was spending the night at a codefendant\u2019s place when the search warrant was executed. No person was named as a target of the search, and her cell phones were within the scope of the warrant. \u201c[T]hat special considerations exist in the context of cellphones\u201d does not change this. The good faith exception applies because a USMJ issued the warrant, and inquiry into the probable cause is moot. United States v. Inyang, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95912 (W.D. Tex. May 30, 2024).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
\u201cCounsel did not perform deficiently when they raised the Fourth Amendment argument [under applicable law at the time], even though this Court and the Seventh Circuit found that the good faith applied.\u201d Castro-Aguirre v. United States, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS … Continue reading