Defendant\u2019s general consent to search his house for cash and drugs included a safe and his wallet. United States v. Baldwin, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73010 (N.D. Ga. June 17, 2011), adopted 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73034 (N.D. Ga. July 7, 2011):<\/p>\n
Defendant contends that the \u201csearch of the safe and the wallet went beyond the scope of any consent [he] could be construed as having given.\u201d (Def.\u2019s Br. 10.) \u201cA consensual search is manifestly reasonable so long as it remains within the scope of the consent.\u201d United States v. Martinez, 949 F.2d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991)). \u201cWhen a defendant gives a general statement of consent, the scope of the permissible search \u2018is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness: what a police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to encompass.\u2019\u201d United States v. Telcy, 362 F. App\u2019x 83, 87 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006)).<\/p>\n
As summarized above, defendant verbally consented to a search of the house in response to SA Mueller\u2019s query whether there were weapons, cash, or narcotics in the house. In addition, defendant signed a form granting consent to search his property and vehicles. (Govt. Ex. 2.) Permission to search an area for narcotics \u201cmay be construed as permission to search any compartment or container within the specified area where narcotics may be found.\u201d Martinez, 949 F.2d at 1119.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
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