Defendant agreed to electronic monitoring as a condition of release, so it was admissible in evidence. United States v. Anthony, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40422 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 6, 2024).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Defendant\u2019s improper lane change was seen in the rearview mirror, so it\u2019s not on dashcam. The officer\u2019s testimony is credited, and the stop was lawful. United States v. Spencer, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40100 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 7, 2024).*<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Even if there was no probable cause to arrest, the later indictment provides it, even though the case was dropped. To invoke the tainted intermediary doctrine, more has to be shown than here. \u201cMerely invoking the taint exception is not enough. See Shaw v. Villanueva, 918 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining \u2018all broth and no beans\u2019 will not suffice to establish the exception). Rather, \u2018a plaintiff must show that the official’s malicious motive led [him] to withhold relevant information or otherwise misdirect the independent intermediary by omission or commission.\u2019 McLin, 866 F.3d at 689. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must at least allege \u2018facts supporting [an] inference\u2019 of such wrongdoing. Id. at 690.\u201d Espinal v. City of Houston, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5552 (5th Cir. Mar. 7, 2024).*<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Defendant agreed to electronic monitoring as a condition of release, so it was admissible in evidence. United States v. Anthony, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40422 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 6, 2024). Defendant\u2019s improper lane change was seen in the rearview mirror, so … Continue reading